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THE MARKET FOR LEADERSHIP IN
CORPORATE LITIGATION
Jessica Erickson*
Conventional wisdom has long held that leadership decisions in
corporate litigation are best left to the lawyers. Even as the world of
corporate litigation has changed dramatically, courts have consistent-
ly relied on the lawyers themselves to decide who among them will
control litigation decisions. As a result, leadership decisions in corpo-
rate litigation are almost always made in private negotiations and
back room deals. This Article pulls back the curtain on these deci-
sions, using empirical data to conduct the first in-depth examination
into the market for leadership in corporate litigation. This examina-
tion reveals a market that bears little resemblance to the ideal imag-
ined by courts and commentators. The reliance on private ordering
forces lawyers to agree to overly complicated leadership structures.
These structures in turn cause lawyers to underinvest in litigation, en-
couraging holdouts and opportunism at the negotiating table. It need
not be this way. Other types of complex litigation, from small-scale
consumer class actions to multidistrict securities class actions, have
successfully avoided such problems. The time has come for corporate
law to draw on these insights and develop a new market for leader-
ship in corporate litigation. In the end, leadership is far too important
to be left to the lawyers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that five shareholders, represented by a total of ten law
firms, file nearly identical lawsuits against the same corporation in a sin-
gle court. Once these suits are consolidated, who decides what claims to
pursue, what discovery to seek, and which settlement offers to entertain?
In other words, in a world of multiple filers, who controls the litigation?
The answer used to be simple. Just a few years ago, corporate law-
suits were far less common. Shareholders focused their energy on the
most promising targets, carefully choosing which mergers and acquisi-
tions to challenge.' Each challenged transaction sparked two, maybe
three, lawsuits.2 Today, however, the world of corporate litigation is far
more complicated. Shareholders contest nearly every significant merger
or acquisition.' Each transaction generates an average of five or six dif-
1. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State
Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 476 (2015) (stating that, in 2005, 39.3% of transac-
tions valued at over $100 million were subject to litigation).
2. See id. at 477 (stating that, in 2005, an average of 2.2 complaints were filed per challenged
transaction).
3. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2013 2 (Ohio St. Pub. L.
& Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 236, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract-id= 2377001 (stating that, in 2013, 97.5% of transactions valued at over $100 million were
subject to litigation).
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ferent lawsuits,' and these lawsuits are often spread across the country in
both state and federal courts.'
The legal system has struggled to keep up with these changes, and
perhaps nowhere is this struggle more apparent than in the rules govern-
ing leadership. Although courts have developed formal rules to deter-
mine leadership disputes, they strongly prefer the parties to resolve these
disputes themselves.6 As a result, leadership decisions are almost always
a result of private negotiations and back room deals.' When it comes to
leadership in corporate law, private ordering-not judicial decision mak-
ing - reigns.
This private ordering matters when it comes to enforcing corporate
law. The legal system largely entrusts the enforcement of corporate law
to private attorneys general.' It matters, therefore, who these private at-
torneys general are and what incentives they have to litigate. According-
ly, leadership decisions go to the heart of how corporate law is ultimately
enforced.
Despite the importance of leadership issues, they have flown largely
under the radar of corporate law scholarship.' A number of scholars have
examined the market for leadership in securities litigation-the federal
law counterpart to the state corporate lawsuits examined here. 0 In addi-
tion, a few scholars have analyzed and critiqued the formal judicial deci-
sions in corporate litigation." No one, however, has ever looked at the
far more consequential informal negotiations that actually determine
leadership in these suits.
4. See id. (stating that, in 2013, an average of 6.9 complaints were filed per challenged transac-
tion).
5. See Cain & Solomon, supra note 1, at 477.
6. See infra Part II.B.
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. See, e.g., Amanda M. Rose & Larry J. LeBlanc, Policing Public Companies: An Empirical
Examination of the Enforcement Landscape and the Role Played by State Securities Regulators, 65 FLA.
L. REV. 395, 399 (2013) (describing the limited role played by state regulators in policing corporate
misconduct).
9. Scholars have written extensively on the increasing frequency of corporate litigation, but
most of the scholarship in this area focuses on the problems that arise between courts when litigation is
filed in more than one forum, not on the problems within a single court. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith &
Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1053, 1058-59
(2013); Brian JM Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo Bias, and Adoption of the Exclusive Forum
Provision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 142 (2011); Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A
Theory of Representative Shareholder Suits and Its Application to Multijurisdictional Litigation, 106
Nw. U. L. REV. 1753, 1757 (2012).
10. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers:
Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1514-15 (2006); James
D. Cox et al., There Are Plaintiffs and . . . There are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities
Class Action Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REV. 355r 369-71 (2008); David H. Webber, The Plight of the
Individual Investor in Securities Class Actions, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 157, 159 (2012).
11. See, e.g., Adam Badawi, Merger Class Actions in Delaware and the Symptoms of Multi-
Jurisdictional Litigation, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 965, 968-70 (2013); Brian Cheffins et al., Delaware
Corporate Litigation and the Fragmentation of the Plaintiffs' Bar, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 427, 483-
85; Griffith & Lahav, supra note 9, at 1088-92.
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This Article looks behind the curtain of leadership decisions, using
two types of empirical data to provide a better understanding of how the
market for leadership works on the ground. First, it relies on interviews
with lawyers who regularly represent plaintiffs in shareholder and other
class action litigation. Second, it uses quantitative data on leadership ne-
gotiations from 200 consolidated corporate lawsuits comprising more
than 850 separate cases filed over a five-year period. Together, this data
allows for the first comprehensive examination of the norms governing
leadership disputes in corporate litigation.
As this examination reveals, the market for leadership bears little
resemblance to the ideal imagined by courts and commentators. In their
interviews, lawyers repeatedly stated that, in these behind-the-scenes
negotiations, they are forced to agree to complicated leadership struc-
tures that divide governance responsibilities among a surprisingly high
number of legal actors. The quantitative data confirms these accounts,
reflecting that even the simplest cases often involve far more law firms
than are necessary to litigate effectively.
As leadership structures grow more complex, they can impact the
incentives to litigate in unexpected ways. 2 Legal fees are split among a
significant number of firms, which dilutes the incentives to litigate these
lawsuits effectively. Firms are reluctant to spend the necessary time or
resources to develop innovative legal theories. And, lawsuits that are liti-
gated by committee are often plagued by inefficiencies. None of these
developments benefit shareholders, who put their trust in plaintiffs' law-
yers to make litigation decisions in their best interests.
Game theory helps explain these dynamics. Over the last several
years, the plaintiffs' bar has grown in size and in turn has become less
able to police itself. This expansion has created incentives for law firms
to hold out in private negotiations for a leadership role and then shirk
their responsibilities in the ensuing litigation. In short, as game theory
predicts, the growth of the plaintiffs' bar means that the legal system
can no longer rely exclusively on private negotiations to police leadership
disputes.
How should corporate law respond to these problems? One possi-
bility is to draw on insights from other areas of law that have successfully
navigated around these same difficulties. Nearly every type of complex
litigation confronts leadership issues, from small-scale consumer class
actions to multidistrict securities class actions. Across this diverse spec-
trum, however, corporate litigation stands alone in leaving so much pow-
er over leadership to the lawyers themselves.14 In federal securities class
actions, for example, leadership decisions are governed by the Private
12. See infra Part III.C.
13. See Part III.B.3; Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Coop-
eration and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 509, 537 (1994) (describing the
role of repeated interactions in policing strategic interactions).
14. See infra Part III.
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Securities Litigation Reform Act," which sets out detailed standards for
lead counsel designations." In other types of complex litigation, there are
not the same bright-line rules, but judges are still far more willing to in-
tervene in leadership disputes.1 7 As these examples illustrate, leadership
decisions need not present the problems that have been so persistent in
corporate litigation.
Corporate law should draw on insights from other types of complex
litigation to address these problems. Comparing leadership practices in
corporate litigation to those in other types of complex litigation, the most
significant difference that emerges relates to the role of judges. The norm
of judicial involvement in other areas stands in stark contrast to the
hands-off approach that dominates corporate litigation. And yet, judicial
involvement in leadership disputes is crucial because the law on the
books has little impact if judges are unwilling to enforce it. This point
reflects foundational principles of negotiation theory-lawyers can only
bargain in the shadow of the law if judges are willing to provide the
shadow." To reform leadership negotiations, therefore, judges in corpo-
rate lawsuits must step up and decide leadership disputes.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II describes the law govern-
ing leadership disputes in corporate litigation. Part III sets out the infor-
mal norms governing these disputes, exploring insights from attorney
interviews as well as quantitative data on leadership practices. Part IV
explores leadership norms in other types of complex litigation, including
consumer, antitrust, and securities class actions. Part V uses these in-
sights to develop a new market for leadership in corporate law. As we
shall see, leadership is far too important to be left to the lawyers.
II. FORMAL MARKET REGULATION
The market for leadership is relatively lawless. To recognize this
point, however, one must first understand the law that does exist to gov-
ern this market. This Part provides that backdrop, first examining the
formal rules governing leadership before turning to the limitations of
these rules.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012).
16. Id. §§ 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)-(v).
17. See infra Part II.A-B.
18. See, e.g., R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 44 (1960) (arguing that
once legal entitlements are clearly defined, parties will bargain for a socially efficient outcome); Barak
D. Richman, Norms and Law: Putting the Horse Before the Cart, 62 DUKE L.J. 739, 745 (2012) ("So
long as the law's shadow is well defined, parties can engage in mutually valuable conduct without
assuming the costs inherent in state-made legal procedures.").
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A. Formal Rules
Formal regulation of leadership came late to the world of corporate
litigation. Traditionally, plaintiffs' law firms relied on informal negotia-
tions to decide leadership.19 If three plaintiffs filed similar lawsuits, their
lawyers would confer and decide how to allocate decision making author-
ity in the case. This informal approach worked because most cases at-
tracted a small number of filers,2 0 making it relatively easy for firms to
share leadership. In addition, most corporate lawsuits arising under state
law were filed in Delaware, and the Delaware bar was relatively small
and close-knit.2 1 As a result, the lawyers typically knew each other and
were able to work out arrangements that fairly allocated the work be-
tween cases.2 These forces combined to promote an extralegal system
that allowed lawyers to resolve leadership disputes without involving the
court.
In the late 1990s, however, this system started to break down.
In large part, this shift occurred as a result of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), which created formal rules
governing leadership in securities class actions-the federal law counter-
part to state corporate lawsuits.2 3 The PSLRA provides a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the shareholder applicant with the largest financial stake
in a case will control the litigation.2 4 This presumption allowed large insti-
tutional investors, such as public pension or retirement funds, to take
control of most securities class actions.2 5 Law firms without these institu-
tional clients soon found themselves shut out of many of these lawsuits. 26
As these firms looked for ways to shift their practices, state corpo-
rate law suits presented a natural opportunity.27 These suits had many of
the same targets-large, public corporations-allowing firms to leverage
their existing networks of small shareholders as plaintiffs.' The legal
19. See TCW Tech. Ltd. v. Intermedia Commc'ns Inc., No. 18336, 2000 WL 1654504, at *3 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) ("Traditionally, the Court of Chancery has allowed counsel representing individual,
class or derivative plaintiffs to engage in a type of private ordering, that is, to coordinate prosecution
of the litigation and to propose the most efficient means of consolidation."). This sentiment was con-
firmed by many of the lawyers whom I interviewed.
20. See Cain & Solomon, supra note 1, at 476-77.
21. See, e.g., Cheffins et al., supra note 11, at 461.
22. The dominance of the law firm of Milberg Weiss LLP also meant that there was a strong
actor with the institutional capital to force compromises when necessary. Several lawyers stated in
their interviews that one former Milberg Weiss partner "could get a case organized" by promising that
he would help the firm out in one case if the firm took a backseat in another case.
23. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (2012).
25. See Cox et al., supra note 10, at 369-71.
26. See Cheffins et al., supra note 11, at 467.
27. Id. at 474 ("Plaintiffs' law firms which brought securities class actions but also had, or could
readily acquire, the ability to bring corporate lawsuits began in the 2000s to pursue the corporate side
with greater vigor.").
28. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation:
Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 167 (2004) ("Almost all shareholder litiga-
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theories in state and federal shareholder lawsuits are different, but there
are enough similarities between these suits that many lawyers were able
to shift their practices relatively easily.9
This shift put stress on traditional leadership rules in two ways.
First, as more firms entered the market, lawsuits that would have once
attracted one or two filers started to attract four or five. 0 With this influx
of filers, it became more difficult to craft a leadership structure that satis-
fied everyone. Second, some of the new entrants brought an entrepre-
neurial bent to corporate litigation, challenging the status quo when it
came to leadership norms. Firms with institutional clients, for example,
argued that they should have a greater role in litigation, rather than
simply taking their pro rata share of the cases.31 Even some firms without
institutional clients began to realize they could get a larger piece of the
pie if they held out during the negotiations, rather than acquiescing to
the traditional approach to dividing cases. These developments destabi-
lized the private ordering that had long dominated leadership disputes in
corporate law.
The changing state of play eventually prompted courts to enter the
fray. The Delaware Court of Chancery was one of the first courts to rec-
ognize a role for judicial intervention in leadership disputes. In a series of
cases starting in 2000, the court articulated what eventually became
known as the Hirt factors.32 These factors include: (1) the quality of the
pleadings; (2) the relative economic stakes of the plaintiffs; (3) the will-
ingness and ability of the contestants to litigate vigorously; (4) the ab-
sence of any conflict between larger, often institutional stockholders and
smaller stockholders; (5) the enthusiasm and vigor with which the vari-
ous contestants have prosecuted the lawsuit; and (6) the competence of
counsel and their access to the resources necessary to prosecute the
claims." No single factor on this list was determinative. Instead, the court
tion in Delaware is against public companies (91 percent: 952 of 1048) . .. [showing] the strong public
corporation focus of Delaware corporate law.").
29. The lawyers with whom I spoke repeatedly confirmed this account. One lawyer stated that
many lawyers simply decided, "M&A litigation looks easy, let's do that." Another lawyer who used to
file primarily securities class actions stated that he had shifted his practice to state corporate lawsuits
after it became difficult to get a leadership role in federal securities cases without institutional clients.
30. Compare Cain & Solomon, supra note 1, at 477 (stating that the mean number of lawsuits per
transaction in 2005 was 2.2), with ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RES.,
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 1 (2013), available at
www.cornerstone.com/Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-M-and-A-Feb-2013 (finding that the mean
number of lawsuits per transaction in 2012 was almost five).
31. This argument was perhaps best reflected in the Delaware Court of Chancery's 2000 decision
in the TCW litigation, which was one of the earliest cases that articulated the factors governing leader-
ship disputes. See TCW Tech. Ltd. v. Intermedia Commc'ns Inc., No. 18336, 2000 WL 1654504, at *4
(Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000). In this case, the law firm of Grant & Eisenhofer, P.A., argued that it should
control the litigation because it represented an institutional client that owned a significant percentage
of the target corporations. Several of the lawyers whom I interviewed told me that this case was signif-
icant because it was one of the first cases in which a law firm challenged the traditional norms favoring
private ordering.
32. These factors come from the Delaware Court of Chancery's 2002 decision in Hirt v. U.S.
Timberlands Serv. Co., CIV. A. No. 19575,2002 WL 1558342 (Del. Ch. July 9,2002).
33. Id. at *2.
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emphasized that it would use its judgment to "establish a leadership
structure that will provide effective representation."
In adopting these factors, the Delaware Court of Chancery explicit-
ly rejected the PSLRA's bright-line rule, stating that it is simply "not
Delaware law."" In other words, the court will not add up the number of
shares owned by the competing shareholder applicants and select the
applicant with the largest number. The court will, however, consider the
relative economic stake of the applicants. 6 If one shareholder applicant
has significantly more shares than the others, and thus a greater incentive
to monitor the litigation, this fact will have "great weight" in the court's
determination of a leadership structure. 7 Overall, however, the court will
analyze all of the relevant factors to determine "which leadership struc-
ture will ensure the most effective representation of the interests of the
plaintiff class.""
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have similarly evolved on the
issue of leadership, impacting corporate lawsuits filed in federal courts.
These rules used to be silent on leadership issues, reflecting a longstand-
ing policy that the trial court should defer to plaintiffs' counsel on leader-
ship matters in federal class actions. 39 As in Delaware, however, this pri-
vate ordering became more difficult as class actions became larger and
more complex. As one commentator explained, the negotiations over
leadership became "the legal equivalent of an unsupervised political
convention without procedural rules or even a credentials committee." 4 0
Ultimately, the lawyers would reach a compromise, but "[t]he price of
such a compromise was often both overstaffing and an acceptance of the
free-riding or marginally competent attorney, whose vote gave him lev-
erage that his ability did not." 41 In other words, when it comes to corpo-
rate litigation, the preference for private ordering in the federal system
led to the same inefficiencies that plagued state practice.
In 2003, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was
amended to require federal judges to appoint class counsel in class ac-
34. In re Del Monte Foods Co. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 6027-VCL, 2010 WL 5550677, at *6
(Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2010).
35. Wiehl v. Eon Labs, No. 1116, 2005 WL 5755542, at *8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22,2005).
36. See id. at *4.
37. See id. at *7; see also Dutiel v. Tween Brands, Inc., No. 4743-CC, 2009 WL 3494626, at *3
(Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2009). Delaware is not alone in adopting a multifactor test to decide leadership.
Other states have adopted flexible standards that generally consider the experience and commitment
of counsel and the qualifications of the shareholder applicant. See, e.g., Sollins v. Alexander, No.
0060127/2006, 2006 WL 4682189 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 11, 2006); Millman ex rel Friedman's, Inc. v.
Brinkley, 2004 WL 2284505, No. 1:03-CV-3831-WSD (N.D. Ga. Oct. 1, 2004).
38. In re Delphi Fin. Grp. S'holder Litig., No. 7144-VCG, 2012 WL 424886, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb.
7,2012).
39. Indeed, the prior version of the Manual on Complex Litigation even instructed trial courts to
allow plaintiffs' attorneys to determine their own leadership structures, reinforcing a strong norm in
favor of private ordering. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LmGATION § 1.92 (5th ed. 1981).
40. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and
Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 877,908 (1987).
41. Id.
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tions filed in federal court.42 This new rule preserved a role for private
ordering, 43 but at the same time, gave courts the express power to inter-
vene if the lawyers could not agree on a leadership structure or the court
did not think that the proposed structure was in the best interest of the
class. In cases that require judicial intervention, Rule 23(g) instructs
courts to consider the competing law firms' work in the specific case, as
well as their experience and resources more generally." The court can
also "consider any other matter pertinent to counsel's ability to fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the class." 45
The Hirt factors, and the similar factors used in corporate lawsuits
filed in federal courts, were designed to bring order to a system that had
grown chaotic. As courts discovered, a system that relies too heavily on
private ordering opens the door to holdouts and opportunism, forcing
law firms to jockey for leadership much like a politician might jockey for
political support. As we shall see, however, courts have undercut these
rules by continuing to promote private ordering over formal adjudication
in the market for leadership.
B. Limitations of the Formal Rules
Despite the promise of formal rules governing leadership in corpo-
rate litigation, private ordering still reigns. Indeed, the formal rules were
never intended to replace private ordering entirely. The rules were only
meant to apply in the rare cases in which the law firms could not negoti-
ate a leadership structure among themselves, and judges have made clear
that these cases should be the exception.
The Delaware Court of Chancery, perhaps more than any other
court, has been particularly outspoken in expressing its continued prefer-
ence for private ordering. In the Hirt case itself, the court recognized that
"it is customary and desirable, where multiple lawsuits are filed relating
to the same transaction or set of facts, for the plaintiffs' lawyers involved
to meet and vote on an organizational structure for the prosecution of
the litigation."46 In a later decision, the Delaware court held that it "al-
ways prefers that plaintiffs' counsel work out an appropriate consolida-
tion compromise. "4 It has repeated this sentiment in nearly every case in
which it has had to decide on a leadership structure, demonstrating its
strong preference for private ordering.4
42. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g).
43. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), FED. JUD. CrR. § 14.211 (2004) (stating
that judges still use varied approaches to determine lead counsel, including private ordering).
44. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(g).
45. Id.
46. Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Serv. Co., CIV. A. No. 19575, 2002 WL 1558342, at *2 (Del. Ch.
July 9,2002).
47. Dutiel v. Tween Brands, Inc., No. 4743-CC, 2009 WL 3208287, at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009)
(emphasis added).
48. See, e.g., Jacksonville Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Moffett, No. 8110-VCN, 2013 WL
297958, at *3 n.11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25,2013) (quoting Hirt that it is "customary and desirable" for plain-
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The lawyers who practice in this area are well aware of this prefer-
ence. In interviews conducted for this Article, lawyers repeatedly refer-
enced the court's strong preference for the lawyers themselves to resolve
leadership disputes. One lawyer, for example, stated that Delaware judg-
es "desperately [do] not want to decide who should be lead plaintiff."
Another stated that the court "hates it when firms fight over leadership."
As a result, these lawyers see themselves between a rock and a hard
place. On one hand, they want judges to take a more active role in lead-
ership decisions so that the parties themselves are not left to work out a
structure on their own. On the other hand, as one lawyer put the point,
"if you litigate leadership, the judges get very angry." In light of this judi-
cial hostility, lawyers only bring a leadership dispute to the court when
they absolutely cannot resolve it among themselves. As a result, accord-
ing to the lawyers, the theoretical possibility of judicial intervention has
had little effect on private ordering in practice.
Many of the lawyers' comments in their private interviews focused
specifically on Delaware, and indeed, Delaware appears the most com-
mitted to private ordering. Yet these lawyers also stated that the leader-
ship process does not differ significantly in other jurisdictions. Delaware
may be the most outspoken, but few courts, whether in Delaware or
elsewhere, want to get involved in leadership battles.
This preference likely stems from the three related factors. First, it
is hard to choose a winner in the typical lead counsel fight. Having
spurned the PSLRA's bright-line rule, courts must weigh multiple factors
to choose lead counsel, and many of these factors simply do not lead to
an obvious choice.49 For example, courts are supposed to consider the
competence of the competing lawyers in deciding on a leadership struc-
ture, and yet in most cases, the firms all have significant experience liti-
gating corporate lawsuits. Similarly, courts are supposed to consider the
quality of the complaint. In most cases, however, firms work from the
same publicly-available information, which means that there is often no
significant difference in quality of the pleadings.so In some cases, the
tiffs' counsel to resolve leadership disputes themselves); Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Rubin, No. 6323-
VCN, 2011 WL 1709105, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2011) ("Ideally, when several related shareholder
class actions are filed in this Court, plaintiffs' counsel will confer and reach consensus regarding a
leadership structure for pursuing the shareholders' interests without the Court's involvement."); Oral
Argument on Cross-Motions for Appointment of Lead Counsel at 4, In re Crimson Exploration, Inc.
Stockholder Litig., No. 8541-VCP, 2013 WL 5890398 (Del. Ch. July 12, 2013) (noting that leadership
fights are "not my favorite kind of a dispute").
49. The court has often acknowledged this difficulty when pressed to decide a leadership dispute.
See, e.g., Wiehl v. Eon Labs, No. 1116-N, 2005 WL 5755542 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 2005) ("After analyzing
the Hirt factors, the court is unable to distinguish between the firms in any meaningful way."); Letter
from Vice Chancellor John W. Noble to Counsel, Fensin v. GenOn Energy, Inc., No. 7721 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 24, 2012) (stating that the "Hirt factors provide little, if any, basis for rationally distinguishing
between the two competing [leadership] proposals").
50. See, e.g., Dutiel v. Tween Brands, Inc., No. 4743, 2009 WL 3208287, at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2,
2009). This point was repeated by several of the lawyers I interviewed. In some cases, a particular law
firm may come up with an innovative theory of liability or develop a richer set of factual allegations,
but in many instances, the competing complaints are functionally identical.
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choice is made easier by the fact that one firm has come up with a novel
theory of liability or has a client with a significantly larger stake in the
litigation. In other cases, however, there is no obvious way to pick a win-
ner, and therefore, courts must choose between essentially comparable
firms."
Second, it is awkward to choose a winner in a leadership fight.
Leadership fights are inherently personal.5 2 In a summary judgment bat-
tle, the judge decides between competing legal arguments. In a leader-
ship fight, the judge decides between competing law firms. Moreover,
judges typically know many, if not all, of the lawyers seeking leadership
roles. A judge who decides that one firm is better than another will likely
have to see lawyers from the rejected firm at conferences or bar func-
tions. This familiarity creates incentives for judges to avoid leadership
disputes."
Finally, it is boring to decide most leadership fights. Delaware judg-
es deal with some of the most interesting issues in corporate law-the
role of the board in times of economic upheaval,5 4 the status of emerging
business forms," and the oppression of minority shareholders in closely
held corporations, just to name a few. 6 Leadership fights raise none of
these interesting topics. Judges want to spend their time on substantive
issues, not procedural wrangling. This distaste leads courts to bend over
backwards to avoid deciding leadership motions, instead telling plaintiffs'
firms to "go in the back room and figure it out.""
So they do. In nearly ninety percent of cases, the plaintiffs' firms
themselves decide on a leadership structure. More specifically, out of two
hundred randomly selected corporate lawsuits filed in the Delaware
Court of Chancery between 2009 and 2013, the law firms themselves de-
cided on a leadership structure in 88.5% of cases. This percentage has
decreased slightly over time, but it never fell below eighty percent for
any of the years studied."
In the end, therefore, the formal rules governing leadership are only
dispositive in a handful of cases. The vast majority of cases are governed
51. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for a Reform, 58 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1, 95 (1991) ("[Elvaluating lawyer competence is exceedingly difficult when the matters in-
volved are ones of judgment rather than simple adherence to rules.").
52. Indeed, several lawyers referred to this process as a "popularity contest" because some judg-
es have perceived favorites among the competing law firms.
53. See, e.g., Oral Argument on Competing Motions for Appointment of Colead Plaintiffs and
Colead Counsel and Class Certification and Rulings of the Court, In re Medco Health Solutions, Inc.,
S'holders Litig., No. 6720-CS, at 79 (Del. Ch. Aug. 23, 2011) (court stating that it decides leadership
disputes "reluctantly" because "I don't wish to hurt anyone").
54. See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
55. See, e.g., Gatz Props., L.L.C. v. Auriga Capital Corp., 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012).
56. See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993).
57. This quote comes from a lawyer interviewed for this Article.
58. As discussed in Part IV, contested leadership disputes were more common in 2013, perhaps
because certain members of the Delaware Court of Chancery indicated a greater willingness to decide
these disputes. See infra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
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by informal negotiations that occur away from judicial scrutiny. As a re-
sult, if we really want to know how leadership decisions are made in cor-
porate law, we must go inside these negotiations.
III. INFORMAL MARKET REGULATION
This Part describes the informal negotiations that dominate the
market for leadership. As described below, attorneys have developed a
robust set of extralegal norms that govern most leadership disputes.
These norms have two important implications for corporate litigation.
First, the reluctance of courts to intervene in leadership disputes creates
incentives for large leadership structures that may not reflect the work-
load in individual cases. Second, although there are benefits to large
leadership structures, this phenomenon can also lead to opportunism and
reduced incentives for the law firms that litigate these suits. This Part
first describes the market for leadership in corporate litigation and then
uses insights from game theory to explain this market.
A. An Empirical Approach to Leadership
For this study, I gathered original data from two primary sources.
First, I conducted a series of semistructured interviews. 9 Second, I re-
viewed leadership orders from corporate lawsuits filed in the Delaware
Court of Chancery. Both sources are briefly discussed below.
Turning first to the interviews, I interviewed a total of twenty-four
lawyers who regularly represent plaintiffs in class action lawsuits. Eight-
een of the lawyers work in the area of corporate litigation; the rest prac-
tice in other types of class action litigation. These lawyers worked at law
firms representing a range of sizes and geographic markets. I spoke with
attorneys at some of the largest and most high-profile law firms in the
field, as well as lawyers that work at smaller firms. The median size of the
firms in my study was nineteen lawyers. Five of the lawyers interviewed
were based in Delaware. Another eleven lawyers were based in offices in
other states on the East Coast, and two lawyers worked for firms based
outside the East Coast. This scope ensured that the lawyers had experi-
ence with leadership issues in a range of jurisdictions.
Second, I interviewed several lawyers who represent class action
plaintiffs in other types of complex litigation, specifically, antitrust, con-
sumer, and securities class actions. These interviews allowed me to com-
pare leadership rules in other types of class actions. Again, these lawyers
came from a variety of practice settings and geographic markets. The
substance of these interviews is described in Part IV below.
59. A semistructured interview is one in which the researcher asks questions, but participants are
also permitted to share their own observations and examples. See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How
the Merits Matter: Directors' and Officers' Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755,
759-60 (2009) (describing semistructured interviews).
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These interviews followed a standard protocol. The interview sub-
jects were chosen by a "snowball" sample technique, which starts with
certain known subjects and relies upon referrals, independent research,
and other sources for additional subjects.w Each interview took an aver-
age of one hour to complete. The interviews all covered the same basic
questions, although specific follow-up questions varied by interview.
They were all undertaken with the understanding that neither the partic-
ipants nor their law firms would be identified and that none of their
statements were for attribution.
The second type of data collected for this study included leadership
orders in 200 consolidated lawsuits representing a total of 857 constituent
cases. These cases were all filed between 2009 and 2013 in the Delaware
Court of Chancery. With each consolidated case, I reviewed the orders
filed with the court memorializing the agreement on leadership, as well
as other relevant case filings.6 1 These cases were randomly selected
through Bloomberg Law, 62 which includes the dockets of all cases filed in
the Delaware Court of Chancery. 3 These orders provide insight into the
leadership structures that commonly result from these negotiations.'
I limited this review to leadership orders in the Delaware Court of
Chancery for three reasons. First, Delaware is the dominant court for
corporate litigation with more corporate lawsuits filed in Delaware than
any other court.6 1 Second, Delaware is extremely influential in the area of
business law, and therefore, its approach to leadership issues is important
60. Many qualitative studies employ a snowball technique to identify interviewees. See, e.g., id.
at 783; Kenneth A. Bamberger & Dierdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63
STAN. L. REV. 247, 263 (2011); Joanna C. Schwartz, A Dose of Reality for Medical Malpractice Reform,
88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1224, 1247-48 (2013).
61. See, e.g., Order of Consolidation and Appointment of Plaintiffs' Lead and Liaison Counsel,
In re Mindspeed Techs., Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 9076-VCN (Del. Ch. Dec. 3, 2013); Order of
Consolidation and Appointment of Co-Lead Counsel, In re Optimer Pharm. Stockholder Litig., No.
8798-VCN (Del. Ch. Sept. 13, 2013).
62. The search was limited to dockets that included any variation of the term "consolidate" or
"lead counsel." I included two categories of cases in this review: (1) cases challenging mergers, acquisi-
tions, or other types of transactions, and (2) derivative lawsuits. I did not include appraisal lawsuits or
section 220 lawsuits seeking to inspect corporate books and records because these cases are less fre-
quent and therefore may not reflect the same norms seen in more routine types of litigation.
63. See E-mail from Michael Korn, Bloomberg Law, to Jessica Erickson (Dec. 16, 2013) (on file
with author) (stating that Bloomberg Law includes all Delaware Court of Chancery dockets from 2003
to the present).
64. Many empirical projects examine only reported decisions available through Westlaw or
Lexis. Such studies suffer from a selection bias because fewer than five percent of decisions are availa-
ble through these databases. See David A. Hoffman et al., Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine,
85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 684-85, 697 (2007) (describing the growing legal movement in conducting
empirical research using full case records). As scholars are increasingly recognizing, litigation research
must be done on the ground, studying case records from start to finish. See, e.g., James D. Cox et al.,
supra note 10, at 367-71; Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate and
Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDS. 111, 114-15 (2009); David L. Schwartz, Practice
Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH.
L. REV. 223,237 (2008).
65. See DAINES & KoUMRIAN, supra note 30, at 2.
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from a national perspective." Third, unlike many other state courts,'6
cases from the Delaware Court of Chancery are available through public-
ly available databases, making Delaware the rare jurisdiction that allows
this type of in-depth analysis.
B. Inside the Negotiations
A close examination of the market for leadership reveals a far more
complicated-and troubling- system than courts and commentators en-
vision. This Section first describes quantitative data regarding the market
for leadership in corporate litigation. It then connects this data with qual-
itative data from lawyers regarding the frustration and inefficiencies that
they experience when they negotiate over leadership. Finally, it uses in-
sights from game theory to explain how these negotiations provide an
opening for holdouts and opportunism that ultimately weaken the en-
forcement of corporate law.
1. Data on Leadership Negotiations
A newcomer to the world of corporate litigation would likely expect
leadership structures in this area to be relatively simple. After all, few of
the cases are overly complex," and most settle within months of filing."9
Moreover, the defendants are often represented by one or two law firms,
suggesting that complex leadership structures are not necessary to liti-
gate these cases.
Yet empirical data demonstrates that the market for leadership in
corporate law is anything but simple. Few cases in the study involved a
single lead counsel with sole control over the case. 0 Instead, the average
leadership structure includes between four and five law firms.71 Such
structures often include two or three firms that serve as co-lead counsel,
one or two firms that serve as members of an executive committee, and
66. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55
STAN. L. REv. 679, 725 (2002) (stating that an "important advantage that Delaware offers is its exten-
sive and widely known corporate case law").
67. Online state docket systems are often woefully incomplete, making it impossible to study a
random selection of leadership decisions in other jurisdictions. See Bernard Black et al., Is Delaware
Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 605, 619 (2012) (noting that these limitations mean
that it is simply "not feasible" to examine corporate law cases across jurisdictions).
68. See infra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
69. According to Cornerstone Research, for example, a majority of lawsuits challenging mergers
and acquisitions settle, and these settlements occur an average of forty-two days after the lawsuit was
filed. See DAINES & KoUMRIAN, supra note 30, at 5.
70. The leadership orders focus on lead counsel, not lead plaintiffs. Only twenty-seven percent
of the leadership orders included a lead plaintiff, reflecting the focus in these cases on law firms rather
than the representative plaintiffs. This focus stands in contrast to federal securities class actions in
which courts are instructed to select a lead plaintiff that will in turn select lead counsel.
71. Specifically, the average number of firms in the leadership structure was 4.4. The median
number of firms was four.
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one firm that serves as liaison, or local, counsel.7 2 The typical leadership
structure, in other words, resembles the figure below.
FIGURE 1
Lead
Counsel
(2-3 firms)
Members of
the Executive
Committee
(1-2 firms)
Liason Counsel
(1 firm)
This structure reflects relatively dispersed power in corporate litiga-
tion. Only three percent of cases involved a single law firm that litigated
the case on its own. Slightly more cases (twelve percent) involved a sin-
gle lead counsel plus one or more firms that served on an executive
committee or had a similar supporting role. Still, the vast majority of cas-
es (eighty-five percent) included at least two firms sharing the lead coun-
sel role, and these firms often themselves shared power with multiple
other firms at lower rungs of the leadership structure.
These leadership structures have stayed relatively stable during the
relevant time period, even as the number of lawsuits has increased expo-
nentially. 3 In 2009, the average leadership structure in a lawsuit filed in
the Delaware Court of Chancery included 4.8 different law firms.74 By
2013, that number had fallen slightly to 3.95 lawsuits. 5
72. The median number of firms in the lead counsel role was two, the median number of firms in
a secondary role (such as a member of an executive committee or a member of a committee of the
whole) was one firm, and the median number of firms serving as liaison counsel was one firm.
73. See infra Table 1.
74. See infra Table 1.
75. As discussed below, this decline may be a result of more active judicial monitoring of leader-
ship structures by select chancellors on the Delaware Court of Chancery. See infra notes 217-221 and
accompanying text. Alternatively, there were several cases in 2013 with a significant number of filers.
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TABLE 1
Number of Firms in
Average Leadership Structure
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These figures show that dispersed power is not a new phenomenon
in corporate litigation. At least for the last several years, it has been
common for law firms to share control of lawsuits.
Finally, the data presented here may even understate the number of
law firms involved in the litigation. This data includes only the law firms
in the Delaware leadership structure. It does not include law firms that
filed related lawsuits in other jurisdictions. Yet, nearly all merger and
acquisition litigation today is filed in more than one jurisdiction."6 Usual-
ly, one or more of these cases is filed in Delaware, but others may be
filed in California, New York, Texas, Nevada, or any other state with a
connection to the underlying allegations."
In lawsuits in which suits are filed in multiple jurisdictions, the law-
yers often confer to determine where the case should go forward." These
negotiations can result in a global leadership structure that gives the law-
yers litigating in one jurisdiction a share of the fees if they agree that the
case will proceed in the other jurisdiction." These agreements fall outside
As the number of cases increases, it becomes harder for the law firms to reach a negotiated agreement
over leadership.
76. Approximately half of all such lawsuits are filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery, and,
even for companies incorporated in Delaware, only sixteen percent of acquisitions in 2012 were chal-
lenged only in Delaware. See DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 30, at 2-3; Thomas & Thompson,
supra note 9, at 1765.
77. See, e.g., Thomas & Thompson, supra note 9, at 1765 ("Typically, suits will be filed in a state
court in the state of incorporation, often the Delaware Court of Chancery, and a second set of almost
identical actions will be filed in a state court where the company's corporate headquarters is locat-
ed.").
78. One lawyer stated, for example, that "camps" from different jurisdictions will negotiate to
allocate work and decide where the case will go forward. Another stated that multijurisdictional litiga-
tion was the "next evolution" of leadership disputes with the "same issues on a larger scale."
79. In some cases, this quid pro quo is explicit. In In re Psychiatric Solutions, Inc. Shareholders
Litigation, the leadership order stated that "[a]ny counsel currently litigating matters related to the
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the scope of this study because they are not filed with any court and
therefore are not available to researchers. As a result of these behind-
the-scenes agreements, however, leadership structures may be even more
complicated than they appear from the leadership orders.
These negotiations allow rent seeking among the lawyers who file in
alternative jurisdictions." The lawyers with whom I spoke stated that
firms often file in other jurisdictions if they do not think they will get a
leadership position in the Delaware case. One lawyer stated, for exam-
ple, that these firms are looking for a "power base. There are fights all
the time with outliers who file in another jurisdiction." These observa-
tions are consistent with legal scholarship that has hypothesized that mul-
tijurisdictional litigation represents "'fee distribution litigation"' in which
"lawyers attempt to derive economic rents by manipulating the jurisdic-
tional and venue rules in which litigation occurs, as distinguished from
adding value through their litigation efforts." 8 '
Leadership orders may also understate the number of firms in-
volved in the case because additional law firms may perform work in the
case even if they do not have a formal role in the leadership structure. In
a number of cases, law firms that did not have a role in the leadership
structure later filed affidavits setting out their work in the case. 2 These
affidavits suggest that, while the data above helps us understand formal
leadership structures, we have less information regarding the informal
roles of firms that perform work behind the scenes.
In sum, the empirical data demonstrates that most leadership struc-
tures are far more complicated than we might envision. Moreover, given
the prevalence of multijurisdictional litigation, the data may even under-
state this dispersal of power. 83 The next question is whether these compli-
Proposed Acquisition in the either state or federal court in Tennessee or elsewhere who are willing to
drop their actions in those courts and prosecute their actions in this Court will be offered a place on
the Executive Committee for purposes of prosecuting the Consolidated Action." See Proposed Con-
solidation Order at 2, In re Psychiatric Solutions, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 5514-CC (Del. Ch. June 8,
2010).
80. Courts are not nalve to this reality, but they have limited power to stop it. See, e.g., Oral
Argument on Motions for Appointment of Co-Lead Plaintiffs, Co-Lead Counsel, and Liaison Counsel
and the Court's Ruling at 25, In re Power-One, Inc. Stockholder Litig. (Del. Ch. June 4, 2013) (No.
8506-VCL), 2013 WL 3948994 (stating that "all you guys are going to do after you figure out who gets
to have the lead role here is go out and negotiate with your brethren about what happens vis-A-vis
jurisdiction").
81. See Thomas & Thompson, supra note 9, at 1757.
82. Compare Stipulation and Order of Consolidation, In re CKE Rests., Inc. S'holders Litig., No.
5290-VCP (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2010) (appointing the firm of Labaton Sucharow LLP as lead counsel
with no other firms in the leadership structure), with Affidavit of Peter D. Bull of Bull & Lifshitz, LLP
In Support of Plaintiffs' Application for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses (stating that the firm of Bull &
Lifshitz had performed 110.5 hours of work on the case, the majority of which occurred after the court
entered the leadership order).
83. For example, following an announcement that Dole Food Co., Inc.'s CEO and Chairman
planned to take the company private, the company was hit with class actions in Delaware and Califor-
nia. The Delaware court entered an order establishing three law firms as co-lead counsel in the Dela-
ware action. See Oral Argument on Cross Motions for Lead Counsel and Ruling of the Court, In re
Dole Foods Co., Inc. (Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 2013) (No. 8703-VCL), 2013 WL 5500167. The California
court established its own leadership structure that included another four law firms. See generally Cor-
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cated leadership structures make sense in light of the particular demands
of the cases. In other words, are so many firms necessary to litigate these
cases effectively, or are other dynamics driving these complicated leader-
ship structures? To answer this question, we need to understand the ne-
gotiations themselves.
2. Lawyers' Dissatisfaction
This Section explores the complex nature of leadership structures
by going behind the scenes through interviews with attorneys who regu-
larly participate in this area. It first describes the frustration that these
attorneys feel regarding these negotiations. It then turns to the dynamics
that drive these negotiations, as well as the impact of these negotiations
on the distribution of attorneys' fees.
a. Frustration with Leadership Negotiations
In theory, negotiated leadership structures should be an acceptable
substitute for judicially imposed orders because the negotiations occur in
the shadow of the law." The lawyers who participate in leadership nego-
tiations are typically experienced practitioners who are well-acquainted
with the ins and outs of state corporate law. As a result, we would expect
that the negotiations would approximate the outcome these lawyers
would get in court. Indeed, we might even expect that the negotiations
would result in better outcomes than these lawyers could get in court.
Negotiation theory states that, when parties bargain in the shadow of the
law, they will only accept a negotiated outcome that leaves them at least
as well off as they would be if they litigated the issue in court.s' If this
premise is correct, lawyers should be satisfied with the leadership struc-
tures that emerge from these negotiations.
Yet, time and again, these lawyers expressed their dissatisfaction
with these negotiations. Indeed, the main takeaway from the interviews
was the utter frustration that these lawyers felt toward the current sys-
tem. Several lawyers told me that negotiating leadership was the worst
part of their jobs. The following quotes illustrate this frustration:
1. The system is "madness."
2. "It's a mess. It's definitely a mess."
rected Order (1) Relating and Consolidating Actions, and (2) Appointing Co-Lead and Liaison Class
Counsel, In re Dole Food Co., Inc., S'holder Litig., No. BC511818 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 22, 2013). All
told, therefore, the leadership structure for a challenge to a single transaction involved a total of seven
law firms.
84. Cf Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 972 (1979). There are also extralegal factors that can influence the
negotiations, including spite, risk preferences, and uncertainty about the law. See id. at 972-75.
85. See Robert H. Mnookin, Strategic Barriers to Dispute Resolution: A Comparison of Bilateral
and Multilateral Negotiations, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 12 (2003) ("By definition, whenever there is
a negotiated agreement in a two-party negotiation both parties must believe that a negotiated outcome
leaves them at least as well off as they would have been if there were no agreement.").
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3. The process is a "free-for-all."
4. It is a "shady underworld, a dirty, dark secret."
5. "It looks a lot like politics. It is a dirty business with strange
bedfellows."
6. The rules lead to leadership structures that are "inefficient" and
"ridiculous."
7. The negotiations do not have "anything to do with the merits of
the case."
These lawyers did not always agree on the necessary reforms, but a
majority of those interviewed stressed that the current market for leader-
ship is rife with problems.
To be fair, not all lawyers shared these views. A minority of the
lawyers interviewed for this project were relatively happy with the cur-
rent approach. These lawyers tended to fall into one of two categories.
First, several lawyers recognized the problems with the current system,
but did not see a better option. For example, one well-respected lawyer
in the plaintiffs' bar told me that he had thought a lot about this issue
and simply could not think of a better alternative. As a result, even
though he recognized the problems with the current system, he did not
think they could be avoided. Second, some lawyers like the current sys-
tem because they benefit from it. Like any system, the market for leader-
ship has winners and losers, and some lawyers have found a way to bene-
fit from the current system even if, as explained in greater detail below,
their participation does not always benefit shareholders.
On the whole, however, the interviews reveal lawyers' deep frustra-
tion with the rules governing leadership in corporate litigation. The next
question is why these lawyers are so frustrated, a question that is inextri-
cably tied to the complicated dynamics that drive these negotiations.
b. Cause of the Frustration
This frustration arises out of a process that, at least on the surface,
looks fairly benign. Lawyers know that courts will consolidate lawsuits
challenging the same merger or corporate decision.16 As a result, soon
after the complaints are filed, lawyers representing the various plaintiffs
start talking about how to divide the consolidated case. In some cases,
the firms will agree to share power equally. In others, they might estab-
lish a more complicated leadership structure, with one or more firms
serving as lead counsel and other firms playing a supporting role as
members of the executive committee or as liaison (i.e., local) counsel.
Once they reach a compromise, they file a stipulation with the court,
consolidating the related cases and establishing the leadership structure.
86. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 42 (providing that a court may consolidate cases involving a com-
mon question of law or fact); DEL. CT. CH. R. 42 (same).
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The court typically grants the stipulated order without any formal review
or revisions." In the interviews, the lawyers did not criticize the process
itself, which seems to have developed into a fairly well-oiled machine.
Nor did these lawyers criticize the substantive law. Most, for exam-
ple, did not want Delaware or other jurisdictions to adopt the PSLRA's
bright-line rules. They liked the flexible nature of the Hirt factors, as well
as the similar standards used in other jurisdictions. Yet, many lawyers
have lost confidence in how the law plays out behind the scenes. The
question then becomes why. If these lawyers are bargaining in the shad-
ow of basically good law, why are they so dissatisfied with the outcomes?
The answer lies in how the law is enforced. The legal system pro-
vides significant opportunities for holdouts during the leadership negoti-
ations. This problem arises because firms do not have an effective mech-
anism to police firms that should not have a role in the case under the
Hirt factors, but that nonetheless refuse to step back and let others lead.
As discussed above, law firms face strong pressure from judges to resolve
the disagreements themselves. As a result, law firms with weaker claims
to a leadership position have little reason to step back and agree to fore-
go a role in the case because they know that the firms with stronger
claims have little recourse."
The power of holdouts was echoed in several of the interviews. One
lawyer stated that some firms have made a business of holding out during
leadership negotiations. Another lawyer stressed that, if this Article says
nothing else, it should stress that judges force the lawyers to negotiate,
rather than resolve the dispute themselves. As a result, "the holdout
firms will get ten percent [of the attorneys' fees]. Everyone else then
wants ten percent as well." According to lawyers, the reluctance of courts
to get involved "gives leverage to the firms with small shareholders,"
even if these firms should not get a leadership position under the Hirt
factors.
Additionally, even if firms do take their disputes to court, the judge
may not impose a more streamlined leadership structure. Several lawyers
stated that courts have traditionally favored inclusive structures that di-
vide work among a large number of firms, even if such structures are not
necessarily the most efficient. For example, one lawyer recounted an in-
stance in which his firm tried to exclude a firm that he knew would not
contribute to the case. The firm challenged its exclusion in court, and the
judge said that the firm had to be treated equally or he would not ap-
prove the leadership structure.
87. In the cases included in this study, the court almost never questioned the parties' proposed
leadership structure. There were a few exceptions, see infra notes 107-12 and accompanying text, but
these cases were few and far between.
88. See Oral Argument for Cross-Motions for Appointment of Lead Counsel at 22, In re Crim-
son Exploration, Inc. Stockholder Litig., (Del. Ch. July 12, 2013) (No. 8541-VCP), 2013 WL 5890398
(noting that counsel argued that "you're never going to get lawyers to reach agreement on leadership
if they think that the Court's just going to add them as co-lead counsel if they can't agree").
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This theme of inclusiveness is reflected in numerous judicial opin-
ions. In one 2011 decision, for example, the Delaware Court of Chancery
expressly instructed lead counsel to share work with the other law firms
that had filed complaints in the case. 9 In the words of the court, the lead
counsel "should act as the captain of the proverbial ship. It is lead coun-
sel's responsibility-after consulting openly and in detail with its client
and other counsel-to allocate work fairly among the willing."" In an-
other case, the court stated that "although the order ... does not give
any role to the attorneys who have been unsuccessful, the Court encour-
ages Lead Counsel to attempt to incorporate them into the case man-
agement structure." 91 As these opinions demonstrate, law firms may well
face resistance from courts if they do not find a role for vocal firms that
filed complaints in the case.
Finally, consistent with the data described above, the lawyers re-
peatedly stated that the leadership structures are influenced by the reali-
ty of the negotiations, not just the needs of individual cases. 2 Several
lawyers stressed that cases almost never need more than three law firms.
One lawyer stated in his interview that most cases only need one or two
law firms, maybe three in the largest cases. The ideal structure, according
to this lawyer, is two law firms, one of which serves as local counsel. An-
other lawyer stated there are benefits to having two firms in a case be-
cause they can each serve as a check on the other, but it "rarely" makes
sense to have more than three firms involved in the case. A third lawyer
put it even more bluntly: "If there are more than 2-3 firms in a leader-
ship position, by definition, that is a failure. It was agreed under duress."
These statements are ironic given that the leadership structures in more
than sixty percent of cases in the sample included four or more law
firms.3
These interviews confirm the concerns from the empirical data in
Part II.B. The dynamics of the negotiations lead to overly inclusive lead-
ership structures in corporate lawsuits. As we will see, these leadership
89. See Se. Penn. Transp. Auth. v. Rubin, No. 6323-VCN, 2011 WL 1709105, at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr.
29, 2011).
90. Id.
91. Coyne v. Catalyst Health Solutions, Inc., No. 7448-VCN, 2012 WL 2052731, at *2 (Del. Ch.
May 25, 2012); see also Letter Opinion, Jauhar v. Skyterra Commc'ns., Inc., No. 4987-CC (Del. Ch.
Oct. 28, 2009) ("I note that the Order provides, and I expect, that [lead counsel] will assign work in a
manner that is consistent with the interests of the class and the talents and availability of all participat-
ing counsel.").
92. The dynamics of these negotiations have been confirmed in oral argument transcripts. For
example, in one oral argument, a lawyer described the negotiations not as a "merits-based decision"
where the law firms discussed the relative strengths of the firms. Instead, the firms simply "carv[ed]
the case into economic slices, percentages." Oral Argument for Cross-Motions for Appointment of
Lead Counsel at 20, In re Crimson Exploration, Inc. Stockholder Litig., Case 8541, at 20 (Del. Ch. July
12, 2013) (No. 8541), 2013 WL 5890398. As described by a lawyer involved in the negotiations, the
premise of the negotiations was that "you should support me because I'll pay you to support me by
giving you a piece of the case." Id.
93. Again, this point is confirmed in oral argument transcripts. See id. at 21 (noting that counsel
stated that "[flour firms is just too much" in a lead counsel role).
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structures dilute the fees received by the law firms running the cases and
in turn reduce the incentives to litigate these lawsuits.
c. Impact of Private Ordering on Legal Fees
Plaintiffs' lawyers in corporate litigation are typically compensated
on a contingency basis. If the case results in a monetary award, the law-
yers will receive a percentage of this award that usually ranges from fif-
teen to twenty-five percent.94 If the case results in a nonmonetary benefit
to the corporation or its shareholders, the court will typically order the
corporation to pay the plaintiffs' lawyers a set amount that reflects,among other factors, the results achieved in the lawsuit as well as the
time and effort expended by counsel to achieve these results.95 Although
courts must approve the total fee award, the law firms themselves deter-
mine how the fees will be divided among the various firms that worked
on the case." In other words, in the typical corporate lawsuit, the alloca-
tion of fees occurs wholly outside the scrutiny of the court.7
The lawyers with whom I spoke were understandably reluctant to
share exact details of their fee arrangements. They were willing, howev-
er, to share some of the general practices relating to the allocation of
fees. First, they stated that the allocation of fees is often decided as part
of the leadership negotiations. Rather than waiting until the end of the
case, they agree up front on how they will divide any fees. As discussed
in Part IV, this approach is not common in other types of complex litiga-
tion.
Second, and relatedly, several lawyers stated that firms may receive
a share of the fees even if they do little or no work. One lawyer told me
that, in general, a member of the executive committee might get ten to
fifteen percent of the fees. The work, however, is not necessarily divided
in these same percentages. Several lawyers told me that the members of
94. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker et al., Setting Attorneys' Fees in Securities Class Actions: An Empiri-
cal Assessment, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1677, 1692 tbl. 1 (2013) (finding that the average attorneys' fees in
securities class actions are approximately 22-23% of the total settlement). There is not similar data on
attorneys' fees in shareholder lawsuits filed under state law, but the percentages are likely to be simi-
lar.
95. See Sugarland Indus., Inc. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142, 149-53 (Del. 1980); In re Plains Res. Inc.
S'holders Litig., No. 071-N, 2005 WL 332811, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 4,2005).
96. The discretion left to lead counsel to divide fees is common in complex litigation. See, e.g.,
Longden v. Sunderman. 979 F.2d 1095, 1101 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that "leaving apportionment of
[fees] to the Susman Attorneys themselves" was within the district court's discretion); In re Vitamins
Antitrust Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 209, 224 (D.D.C. 2005) (reviewing case law holding that "lead counsel
should have the initial responsibility for allocating fees from an aggregate award").
97. As explained below, law firms in corporate litigation often decide how to divide these fees as
part of their negotiations early in the litigation. If they later disagree on the allocation, they may medi-
ate their dispute, a process that again happens outside the supervision of the court. See Oral Argument
on Motions for Appointment of Co-Lead Plaintiffs, Co-Lead Counsel, and Liaison Counsel and the
Court's Ruling at 45, In re Power-One, Inc. Stockholder Litig., (Del. Ch. June 4, 2013) (No. 8506-
VCL), 2013 WL 3948994 (referencing a mediation regarding a fee dispute). The use of mediation to
resolve fee disputes was also mentioned in the lawyers' interviews, with one lawyer stating that he had
been involved in a number of mediations over fees in the last several years because "money is the
biggest thing people fight over."
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the executive committee do little, if any, work. They might review docu-
ments. They might take a deposition. They might not do any work at all.
Their ten or fifteen percent may just be a payoff for agreeing to the lead-
ership structure. As one lawyer stated, "the executive committee doesn't
mean much. Mostly, it means that you are agreeing to the leadership
structure." Another lawyer stated that being on the executive committee
was "code for 10-20 percent and stay out of the way."
It is important not to overstate this point. The negotiations over fees
vary from case to case, and in some cases, the distribution of fees is ex-
plicitly tied to the distribution of work. But, as one lawyer stated, in the
"vast majority of cases" the distribution of fees occurs up front during
the leadership negotiations, a practice that one lawyer likened to a "divi-
dend payout," while another stated that it came closer to "extortion." As
we will see, these observations are entirely predictable when viewed
through the lens of game theory.
3. Connecting Data and Dissatisfaction
The discussion thus far raises one crucial question. If negotiations
over leadership take place in the shadow of the law, why does the reality
fall so short of the structure envisioned by the law? In other words, if
lawyers control these negotiations, why do they repeatedly agree to lead-
ership structures that create such problems? Game theory helps answer
this question. This Subsection explores the impact of strategic deci-
sionmaking on private ordering in corporate litigation.
Leadership negotiations in corporate litigation are different from
the classic prisoner's dilemma. In the prisoner's dilemma, individuals
have no incentive to cooperate because they face only a single negotia-
tion." As a result, they will pick the outcome that maximizes their payoff
in that interaction without regard to the impact of their decision on the
other player." Similarly, if negotiations over leadership took place in iso-
lation, we would expect each law firm to protect its own interests in the
case, even if doing so hurt other firms or the case more generally.
Negotiations over leadership, however, differ from the prisoner's
dilemma in one crucial respect. Unlike the prisoners in this classic game,
the lawyers involved in these negotiations have repeated interactions
with each other. This familiarity means that negotiations over leadership
look more like a repeated game in which the same parties repeatedly
face the same type of interactions,10 rather than the single-shot negotia-
tion of the prisoner's dilemma.
Repeat games have the potential to avoid the problems of the pris-
oner's dilemma. If individuals know that they will be dealing with each
98. See DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 9-11 (MIT Press 1991) (describing
the prisoner's dilemma).
99. See id.
100. Cf Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 13, at 537-38.
No. 4] 1501
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
other in the future, they will not want to shirk their responsibilities for
fear of hurting their reputations and being excluded in later interac-
tions."o' As a result, they will adopt a long-term strategy that protects
their standing among the other players in the game and maximizes their
overall long-term payout.10 2
To illustrate this point, imagine a negotiation between four law
firms who frequently interact with each other.03 Given these repeated
interactions, the law firms should craft leadership structures that over the
long term benefit the group as a whole. They might, for example, agree
to trade off as lead counsel in particular cases, recognizing that their
agreement to step aside in one case will benefit them in future cases.
Similarly, each firm will have an incentive to perform its fair share of the
work in individual cases because firms that shirk could be excluded from
later leadership roles.
The theory of repeat games helps explain why courts favor pri-
vate ordering in the leadership market. Courts may well assume that,
given the repeated nature of their interactions, law firms will reach solu-
tions that promote the long-term interests of themselves and their clients.
Indeed, if this assumption was correct, greater judicial involvement
would be unnecessary.
This assumption, however, does not always reflect the realities of
the negotiations. The benefits of repeated interactions depend on the
parties' ability to exclude those who shirk on their responsibilities. As
detailed above, a law firm will only act against their interests in a single
interaction if the firm fears being excluded in future interactions if it does
not cooperate. If the firm knows that it can shirk with impunity, it will
not fear long-term consequences and the negotiations will instead re-
semble a single-stage interaction.
In negotiations over leadership, the firms have a limited ability to
punish law firms that shirk their responsibilities for three reasons.34 First,
as discussed above, courts are reluctant to punish shirkers.1 0s Courts often
refuse to decide leadership disputes, insisting that the lawyers resolve
their differences.'" Even if the court agrees to hear the dispute, it may
appoint multiple lead counsel or strongly encourage lead counsel to craft
101. See JAMES D. MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 261 (1994) ("A reputa-
tion can deter the first player from taking actions against the second player's interests.").
102. See id.
103. This discussion is based on the economic theory underlying the infinitely repeated game.
Although law firms are unlikely to handle leadership negotiations over an infinite amount of time, the
infinite repeated game still applies because the parties do not know when their repeated interactions
will come to an end. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 167 (1994)
(stating that "[t]he finitely repeated game is the appropriate model only if the parties know with cer-
tainty exactly when the game will end").
104. See MORROW, supra note 101, at 268 (explaining that cooperative strategies can break down
if reciprocal punishment strategies are not credible).
105. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
106. See id.
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an inclusive leadership structure.'" These practices limit the ability of
firms to punish those who do not live up to their responsibilities.
It is important not to take this point too far. Judges can and do de-
cide leadership disputes. Indeed, as discussed above, the court decided a
contested leadership battle in more than ten percent of the cases in my
study." Moreover, in at least a few instances, courts have rejected the
parties' proposed leadership structure and established a more stream-
lined structure.'" In other cases, courts replaced firms as lead counsel
when the court did not think that the case was being litigated effective-
ly."10 In short, courts may be reluctant to decide leadership disputes, but
they rarely refuse to do so."' Their reluctance, however, makes lawyers
hesitant to press the issue in court.
Second, firms are reluctant to seek judicial intervention because
leadership battles have high transaction costs. It takes longer to get a fi-
nal resolution on leadership issues when the court has to wade into the
dispute,'1 2 and this difference matters in certain types of corporate law-
suits. Specifically, in lawsuits challenging mergers or acquisitions, the
plaintiffs often sue to enjoin the transaction. Once the transaction closes,
the settlement value of the case plummets."' As a result, the plaintiffs
face strong incentives to organize quickly so that they do not weaken
their settlement position in the litigation. Law firms may decide to in-
clude a firm known for shirking simply because they do not want to
spend time defending their leadership structure in court.
Third, the relatively indeterminate legal standards used to decide
leadership disputes make it difficult for counsel to predict with any cer-
107. See Coyne v. Catalyst Health Solutions, Inc., C.A. No. 7448-VCN, 2012 WL 2052731, at *2
(Del. Ch. May 25, 2012) ("Although the order of consolidation does not give any role to the attorneys
who have been unsuccessful, the Court encourages Lead Counsel to attempt to incorporate them into
the case management structure."); Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Rubin, No. 6323-VCN, 2011 WL 1709105,
at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29., 2011) ("This is not an appointment that empowers lead counsel to take most
of the work or the 'good' work for itself. In short, the role of lead counsel, not to be profound, is to
lead.").
108. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Order Granting Class Certification, Appointing Class Representatives, and Estab-
lishing Leadership Structure at 3, In re Astex Pharms., Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 8917-VCL (Del.
Ch. Nov. 1, 2013) (denying proposed leadership structure that included nine different law firms be-
cause "[s]uch a structure risks significant duplication of effort and decisional inefficiencies"); Order
Denying Proposed Order of Consolidation at 4, Hardy v. Hawk Corp., No. 5925-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov.
4, 2010) (denying proposed leadership structure because "I will not approve an order contemplating a
non-substantive role for Delaware counsel. You are not a drop box.").
110. See, e.g., In re Revlon, Inc. S'holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 957 (Del. Ch. 2010).
111. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Klein v. Walton, (Del. Ch. July 24, 2012) (No. 7455-
CS) (stating that the court had "recently decided several" leadership disputes and "j]ust picked....
I[t] had no problem.").
112. In cases in which the lawyers themselves decide on a leadership structure, the length of time
between the first filed suit and the first leadership order was twenty-one days. In cases in which the
court established a leadership structure, this time increased to thirty-five days.
113. The objective of the plaintiffs is either to (1) convince the court to halt the transaction, which
will allow a more typical pace for the litigation, or (2) reach a settlement with the defendants before
the scheduled closing of the transaction. Neither option is likely until there is a leadership structure for
the various filers because courts will not force defendants to answer the complaints or respond to
discovery until the cases are organized.
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tainty how the court will rule."4 It is more difficult for parties to bargain
in the shadow of the law when they are not sure what the law is. In their
interviews, the lawyers all stated that the Hirt factors mattered, but often
stressed different factors when asked which ones were the most im-
portant. Some lawyers insisted that the client's stockholdings were the
most important factor, while others stressed the quality of the pleadings
or the firm's reputation. One lawyer was especially blunt on this point,
stating that the Hirt factors are like "bible verses" because "you can al-
ways find factors and cases to support your position." As a result, lawyers
almost always have a basis to argue that they should have a role in the
leadership structure. This indeterminacy makes it more difficult for pri-
vate ordering to reflect the formal legal standards.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the legal market no longer
resembles the small, tight-knit market that would allow law firms to easi-
ly punish shirkers."' The data from this study illustrates that the law
firms that file corporate lawsuits have grown beyond the close communi-
ty envisioned by courts. More than sixty different firms served as lead
counsel or co-lead counsel in the two hundred cases examined for this
Article."6 More than one hundred different firms had some sort of lead-
ership role (either as lead counsel, a member of an executive committee,
or liaison counsel) in these cases."' As the market expands, it is more
difficult for firms to do the long-term bargaining and monitoring that are
necessary to ensure cooperative interactions."' Firms, for example, can-
not easily enter into arrangements to trade leadership roles in different
cases. Nor can they easily punish firms that shirk their responsibilities
because they may not work with the same firm for a long period of time,
or they may be in a case with other firms that have not had a bad experi-
ence with the firm.
These reasons all help explain why leadership negotiations do not
always promote the cooperative decision making envisioned in game
theory scholarship. The complicated dynamics of real-world negotiations
mean that many of the assumptions underlying repeated games simply do
not hold in the leadership market. The next question is how these leader-
ship structures impact the enforcement of corporate law more generally.
114. Cf Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463,
2500 (2004) (stating that, in criminal law cases involving indeterminate sentencing, "optimism may
lead each party to look at the bargain differently through its own rose-colored glasses").
115. See, e.g., Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 13, at 537 ("Central to the potential for lawyers to
facilitate a cooperative solution to a prisoner's dilemma litigation game is an effective reputation mar-
ket for lawyers. Lawyers must be able to earn and maintain observable reputations for cooperation,
and lawyers must be able to observe breaches of reputation by opposing counsel and have an interest
in reporting these breaches.").
116. There was not a clear division between the firms that served as lead counsel and the firms
that had a more supporting role. Some firms refuse to participate in a case if they are not lead or co-
lead counsel, but most occupy a variety of roles across cases.
117. See supra Part III.B.1.
118. See, e.g., Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 13, at 537.
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C. Broader Implications of Private Ordering
Taken together, the quantitative and qualitative data on leadership
structures present a compelling picture of dysfunction in the market for
leadership. The key question, however, is whether this dysfunction im-
pacts the enforcement of corporate law. After all, it would be nice if
plaintiffs' lawyers were satisfied with their working relationships, but
these lawyers are sophisticated players who can generally take care of
themselves. The more pressing concerns arise when problems with lead-
ership impact shareholders, who rely on lawyers to protect their legal
interests. This Section explores the costs, as well as some surprising bene-
fits, of the reliance on private ordering in leadership negotiations.
1. Costs of Private Ordering
Dispersed leadership structures can negatively impact corporate
lawsuits in three ways. First, they can reduce the incentives to litigate
these cases effectively. Second, they can impact the development of in-
novative legal theories or strategies in these cases. Finally, they can cre-
ate inefficiencies, turning litigation into decision making by committee. I
discuss each in turn below.
a. Reduced Incentives to Litigate
The goal of contingency fees in class action litigation is to provide
plaintiffs' lawyers with appropriate incentives to litigate cases on behalf
of absent class members.119 Leadership structures, however, can under-
mine these incentives because, if a law firm gets a seat at the table, it also
receives a portion of the fees.
As discussed above, lawyers were reluctant to share the exact de-
tails of their fee arrangements. 2 0 They also stressed that these arrange-
ments varied from case to case. Yet, several lawyers stated that it would
not be unusual for the lead counsel in a given case to receive sixty-five
percent of the fees, with the remaining thirty-five percent going to mem-
bers of the executive committee and liaison counsel.12 ' Assuming that
division, if a given case ends with $1 million in fees, lead counsel will re-
119. See Lisa L. Casey, Reforming Securities Class Actions from the Bench: Judging Fiduciaries
and Fiduciary Judging, 2003 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1269 ("By deferring compensation to counsel until
the class realizes a positive gain at the conclusion of the case, contingency fees give class counsel a
direct interest in the outcome of the litigation, thus aligning counsel's interests with the interests of the
class.").
120. See supra Part III.B.2.c.
121. These statements also find support in oral argument transcripts where lawyers have occa-
sionally been pressed to disclose their fee offers to other firms. See, e.g., Oral Argument on Motions
for Appointment of Co-Lead Plaintiffs, Co-Lead Counsel, and Liaison Counsel, and the Court's Rul-
ing at 31, In re Power-One, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 8506-VCL (Del. Ch. June 4, 2013) (counsel
stated that they had offered another firm ten percent of the fees in exchange for supporting the leader-
ship structure, an offer that the court stated was consistent with "what I was going to guess").
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ceive $650,000, while the other lawyers in the case will receive $350,000.
The figure below reflects this division.
FIGURE 2
I 65%
30%
LiasonI Counsel 5%
This allocation of fees raises questions about the incentives of the
lawyers to litigate the case effectively. If $1,000,000 was the amount nec-
essary to get effective representation in the case, then we are not paying
lead counsel enough. As a result, we should expect lead counsel to un-
derinvest in the lawsuit. The lawyers interviewed for this Article repeat-
edly expressed this concern. One stated, for example, "The incentives
can get crazy. If too many firms are demanding percentages, the lead
firms don't have a big enough stake to incentivize them to work hard on
the case."
Alternatively, it could be that $650,000 is an adequate amount to
incentivize lead counsel to litigate the case. This possibility, however,
does not improve the overall picture. If lead counsel will vigorously pur-
sue the case even though it will only receive sixty-five percent of the legal
fees, then the remaining $350,000 is a deadweight loss. The shareholders
of the target corporation paid this amount and got nothing in return. In
other words, courts may be paying lawyers $350,000 of other people's
money to avoid deciding leadership disputes.
The economics get even worse when multijurisdictional litigation is
added to the mix.'22 Imagine that, in addition to a single consolidated case
in Delaware, there are another three cases in New York state court. In a
multijurisdictional scenario, lead counsel in Delaware may have to pay
out another ten to fifteen percent of the case to the New York lawyers in
exchange for these lawyers agreeing to litigate the case in Delaware or
122. See DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 30, at 3 (stating that, for firms incorporated in
Delaware, sixteen percent of mergers and acquisitions were challenged only in the Delaware Court of
Chancery).
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agreeing not to object to the settlement. The figure below reflects a pos-
sible allocation of fees in a case involving multijurisdictional litigation.123
FIGURE 3
Lecad 60%
(2 tirms)
lembers" of the 25%
Exe cutiNve Comimittee,(
(2 tirms)
Lias on Counsevl 5%
10%
This payout to out-of-state counsel means that lead counsel may
receive an even smaller percentage of the fees, further weakening their
incentives to pursue the case.
These concerns rest on the assumption that the contributions of the
other law firms in the case are not worth their share of the fees. In a per-
fect world, each firm would receive a percentage of the overall fees that
exactly corresponds with their contribution to the litigation. Based on my
conversations with plaintiffs' lawyers, however, there is reason to doubt
that the contributions of the firms in the lower rungs of the leadership
structure are worth the full amount these firms are receiving. This point
builds on the analysis of fees in Part II.B.1 in two important ways.
First, although the lawyers in these lower levels may do some work,
it is not the high-level work that deserves the highest levels of compensa-
tion. Lead counsel typically does the strategic work, making substantive
decisions that drive the litigation forward, while the other firms review
123. Given the private nature of these agreements, there is little data on how fees are allocated
among counsel litigating the same dispute in different forums. In the few cases in which these multi-
jurisdictional fee disputes have been brought to the court, the court has either instructed counsel to
resolve the dispute themselves or ordered counsel to share the fees. See, e.g., In re Allion Healthcare,
Inc. S'holders Litig, No. 5022 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2011) (ordering Delaware and New York to split part
of the fees evenly); In re Burlington N. Santa Fe S'holders Litig. No. 5043, at $10 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28,
2010) (providing a global fee award for Delaware and Texas counsel and ordering counsel to divide
the fee themselves).
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documents or take low-level depositions.1 24 And yet several lawyers stat-
ed that it is possible that lead counsel may end up with a lower multiplier
than the firms in these lower rungs. In other words, lead counsel may get
a lower hourly rate than firms that serve in a subordinate role.
Second, as described above, the law firms in these lower rungs may
not do any work on the case. Some firms were quite candid that firms on
the executive committee do not expect to have to do any work at all. This
point was exemplified by the statement quoted above that being on the
executive committee was "code for 10-20 percent and stay out of the
way." Another lawyer stated that firms in these lower rungs of the lead-
ership structure may do some work, but in many cases, their role is
"more of a fiction" amounting to a "tax" that lead counsel pays to get a
leadership role.1 25
In short, there are strong indications that lawyers may be dividing
cases in ways that reduce incentives to litigate. These reduced incentives
in turn impact how cases are litigated. If lawyers know that it is not worth
their time to put additional work into a case, they will settle early in the
litigation or skimp on the heavy lifting it takes to put together a success-
ful case.1 26 This observation corresponds to the problems often seen in
this area of the law. 12 7 Shareholders file a significant number of cases, but
the cases often involve little litigation activity, with one Delaware judge
calling these litigation practices a "Kabuki dance." 12 And, to the extent
that leadership decisions impact incentives to litigate, it is ultimately
shareholders who will bear the brunt of these decisions.
124. See, e.g., Oral Argument, Plaintiffs Motion to Consolidate and Motion for Expedited Pro-
ceedings at 12, Black v. Cox Commc'ns, Inc., No. 630 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2004) (stating that a firm on
the executive committee has "no meaningful input" into how a case gets litigated).
125. See, e.g., Oral Argument on Motions for Appointment of Co-Lead Plaintiffs, Co-Lead Coun-
sel, and Liaison Counsel, and the Court's Ruling at 46, In re Power-One, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No.
8506-VCL (Del. Ch. June 4, 2013) (law firm allegedly demanded "seventeen percent" of the fees and
"no work" in exchange for supporting the leadership structure).
126. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 231 (1983) ("If the private enforcer is
risk averse and therefore will not gamble his time and effort on an extended litigation, his most logical
strategy is to bring a high volume of cases, thereby spreading his risk, but in consequence investing
relatively little time or effort in any single case.").
127. For example, one scholar has recently stated that "[cllose students of M&A litigation have
recognized that such litigation often has a 'phantom' character. Plaintiffs rush to file, then fight in-
tensely over the appointment of lead counsel, but thereafter take little discovery, conduct no deposi-
tions, and make few motions." John C. Coffee, Jr., Foreword: The Delaware Court of Chancery:
Change, Continuity-and Competition, 2012 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 387, 397 (2012).
128. In re Revlon, Inc. S'holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 945 (Del. Ch. 2010); see also Oral Argu-
ment: Motion to Appoint Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel and the Court's Ruling at 43, 62, In re
Activision Blizzard, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 8885-VCL (Del. Ch. Dec. 3, 2013) (providing that the
court stated that "as a practical matter, . . . the business model of the vast majority of plaintiffs' law-
yers" is to "settle ... case[s] without discovery").
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b. Less Innovation
The common law system depends on active litigants who can en-
courage innovation in the law. 129 In a world in which everyone gets a seat
at the table, however, firms may not have adequate incentives to invest in
this innovation.
This point builds on well-accepted principles of intellectual property
law. Individuals have the greatest incentives to innovate when they have
a property right in the product of their innovation.3 0 A Silicon Valley
entrepreneur, for example, will only strive to create the next Google if
she knows that she will reap the financial rewards if her product is suc-
cessful in the marketplace. The legal system protects these incentives by
giving entrepreneurs property rights in their inventions in the form of
patents or other intellectual property rights.
Lawyers do not have formal property rights in the cases they file. In
most lawsuits, however, lawyers have de facto property rights because
they are chosen by one party to represent their interests. Class actions
are different. A class action lawyer could spend the time and money to
develop a case only to see another law firm appointed lead counsel. If
lawyers see this loss as a realistic threat, they may decide not to spend
the resources to develop their cases in the first instance."' Instead, they
will try to free ride on the work of others.
Courts purport to protect innovation through the legal standards
governing leadership. Both the Hirt factors and rule 23(g), for example,
take into account the quality of the pleadings in selecting lead counsel.13 2
If a law firm takes the time to develop an innovative angle or legal theory
in a case, it will have an advantage in a later leadership fight. Otherwise,
as at least one court has noted, "If other lawyers can free ride by copying
a well-crafted complaint, counsel will have diminished incentives to in-
vestigate potential claims and file good cases." 3
Such rules, however, may lack teeth for two reasons. First, the
strength of these property rights depends on the willingness of courts to
enforce them. As discussed above, many lawyers believe that courts will
go to great lengths to avoid leadership disputes and may even flat-out
129. See generally Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Class Action Lawyers as Lawmakers,
46 ARIZ. L. REV. 733 (2004) (discussing the role of litigators in promoting the evolution of the law).
130. See Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual Property's Down-
side, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921, 922 (2010).
131. Scholars have directly tied the lack of property rights in class action litigation to reduced
incentives to litigate. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 126, at 233 ("In economic terms, this is a classic prob-
lem of inadequately specified property rights-the private attorney is in the same position as an inven-
tor who knows he cannot patent an invention that he forsees [sic] or a prospector who cannot stake
out a legally blinding claim. In such situations, one cannot reasonably expect the inventor or prospec-
tor to invest the same effort in search and discovery as they would if they could be assured of the abil-
ity to reap the full economic return from their invention or discovery.").
132. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g); Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Serv. Co. LLC, 2002 WL 1558342, at *2 (Del.
Ch. July 3, 2002).
133. In re Del Monte Foods Co. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 6027-VCL, 2010 WL 5550677, at *9
(Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2010).
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refuse to decide these disputes. 3 4 As a result, lawyers may agree to share
ownership over the cases that they develop, despite formal rules to the
contrary.
Second, law firms may have no need to innovate because they can
instead free ride off the work of others. In a system based on dispersed
leadership structures, lawyers can easily get a seat at the table in most
cases simply by finding a plaintiff and filing a parallel action. These law-
yers may not be appointed lead counsel, but they will likely get a role on
the executive committee."' Lawyers can make a good living by taking a
small piece of a large number of cases. The result of this practice is that
firms have little incentive to seek out new types of misconduct or develop
new legal theories.
This argument does not mean that innovation is absent from corpo-
rate litigation. In a number of shareholder disputes, plaintiffs' lawyers
have developed novel theories of liability that have advanced the devel-
opment of the law."' Yet, the legal system should do more to encourage
this kind of innovation. Litigation, especially in common law areas, pro-
vides opportunities for the evolution of the law.' 7 This process is essen-
tial in corporate law because litigation is one of the chief ways to ensure
that corporate boards are responsive to the interests of shareholders.13 8 If
state law does not reflect the changing practices of the boardroom and
the market, it will cease to serve as an effective mechanism for accounta-
bility. In short, a lack of innovation in litigation can lead to a lack of in-
novation in the law.
c. Greater Inefficiencies
Dispersed leadership structures can also lead to inefficiencies in
how cases are litigated. Corporate litigation today is litigation by commit-
tee. Lead counsel is responsible for determining the overall strategy of
the case, but it then divides the necessary work to execute this strategy
134. See supra Part I.B.
135. They may also control the less lucrative cases that the high-profile firms do not want, and
even these suits will likely end with hundreds of thousands of dollars of attorneys' fees.
136. For example, in 2012, the law firms of Prickett, Jones & Elliott, P.A. and Kessler Topaz
Meltzer & Check LLP filed lawsuits against a number of Delaware corporations that had adopted
bylaw provisions requiring shareholder lawsuits to be litigated exclusively in Delaware. The firms
argued that these bylaws violated unlawfully curtailed shareholders' rights by limiting where they can
litigate. See Alison Frankel, Shareholder Lawyers Sue Over Delaware Forum-Selection Bylaws, REU-
TERS (Feb. 8, 2012), http:/Iblogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2012/02/08/shareholder-lawyers-sue-over-
delaware-forum-selection-bylaws. These suits fell outside the traditional mold, but were remarkably
successful, with most of the targeted companies repealing the challenged bylaws. See Claudia H. Allen,
Exclusive Forum Provisions: Putting on the Brakes, BLOOMBERG BNA: CORPORATE ACCOUNTABIL-
ITY REPORT 2 (Dec. 14, 2012). These cases demonstrate that some firms are taking a risk, and this risk
is paying off.
137. See, e.g., John C. Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Common Law, 7 J.
LEGAL STUDS. 393, 393-94 (1978) (analyzing a theory of common law development in which ineffi-
cient legal theories are discarded through constant litigation).
138. See Thomas & Thompson, supra note 9, at 1758-59.
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among several other law firms. These firms, in turn, have responsibility
for particular facets of the case, from discovery to expert witnesses.
This allocation of responsibilities can be beneficial. As discussed in
greater detail below, dispersed leadership structures allow lawyers to
pool resources, share risks, and exchange ideas, all of which benefit ab-
sent class members. Yet, there are downsides to committees as well.139 If
there is not a true captain of the ship, as in a case with multiple firms
serving as lead counsel, there may not be anyone to drive the litigation.
Similarly, it takes significantly more time for five firms to sign off on a
motion than if one firm alone can make a decision.'40
The lawyers interviewed for this Article confirmed these concerns.
One lawyer stated, "It makes no sense to have more than one firm in-
volved. It is so horribly inefficient and leads to duplicative work. You try
to divide up the work, but you still have ten lawyers on every call and
everyone wants to read everything. From a business standpoint, it makes
no sense." Another lawyer stated that lawsuits can become a "circus."
These incentives also cause firms to file lawsuits soon after transac-
tions are announced,14' even if firms have not had time to investigate pos-
sible wrongdoing. Collectively, each firm would rather take the time to
investigate possible claims and determine whether the litigation has mer-
it before filing suit. Individually, however, each firm has an incentive to
file early and submit a proposed leadership structure before too many
other firms join the case.'42 As a result, even though lawyers bemoan the
rush to the courthouse, they face strong incentives to file early rather
than conducting a thorough prefiling investigation.143
139. Cf In re Milestone Scientific Secs. Litig., 187 F.R.D. 165, 176 (D.N.J. 1999) (holding that a
"'litigation by committee' approach to securities class actions may prove 'unnecessary and wasteful"').
140. Defense counsel have noted this concern as well. In one oral argument, the lawyer for the
defendants urged the court to pick a single firm as lead counsel, with no more than one other firm as
liaison counsel, because the defendants could otherwise find themselves negotiating with multiple
firms or learning after the fact that some firms in the leadership structure will not agree to a deal nego-
tiated by other firms in the leadership structure. See Oral Argument for Cross-Motions for Appoint-
ment of Lead Counsel at 48, In re Crimson Exploration, Inc. Stockholder Litig., (Del. Ch. July 12,
2013) (Case 8541-VCP), 2013 WL 5890398.
141. See DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 30, at 1 (finding that lawsuits challenging mergers and
acquisitions are filed an average of fourteen days after the deal is announced).
142. According to the lawyers interviewed for this Article, law firms start organizing a proposed
leadership structure as soon as the first cases are filed. A firm that takes the time to conduct a thor-
ough investigation before filing a complaint may find itself shut out of the leadership structure. If the
late filer has a strong argument in favor of a leadership role, it may be able to convince the other filers
or the court to amend the leadership order. If the late filer has credentials and a client comparable to
those of the earlier filers, however, it may well not be able to get a place in the leadership structure. As
a result, firms file early rather than risk having to fight for a role in the case after other firms have
already agreed to a leadership structure.
143. Several lawyers criticized this trend, with one noting, for example, that "if you wait to file,
you can be shut out of the leadership structure."
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2. Benefits of Private Ordering
Despite the many concerns about the functioning of the leadership
market, private ordering also has its advantages. First, private ordering
makes it easier for attorneys to diversify their risk by maintaining a port-
folio of litigation. Second, private ordering reduces the barriers to entry
for new law firms hoping to enter the practice area. Finally, private or-
dering allows the parties to move more quickly to the merits of the litiga-
tion. Before discounting private ordering, therefore, we should recognize
the benefits that private ordering brings to the market for leadership.
a. Portfolio Approach to Litigation
Private ordering allows plaintiffs' firms to manage a portfolio of liti-
gation.'" Legal scholars have long recognized that such portfolios are
crucial to the business model of many firms that file class action law-
suits. 145 These firms typically accept cases on a contingency basis, and, as
a result, they only get paid if the cases end with a favorable outcome. Ra-
ther than put all of their eggs into one basket, firms invest in multiple
lawsuits just as shareholders might invest in multiple companies. 146
The small size of most plaintiffs' firms hampers their ability to di-
versify fully. 147 A single firm with five lawyers may only be able to litigate
four or five lawsuits on their own in a given year, making their financial
fortune dependent on the outcomes of a relatively small number of cases.
On the other hand, if this firm is able to obtain a position as lead or co-
lead counsel in four cases and a position on the executive committee in
another ten cases, the firm can more effectively spread out its risk.
Several lawyers interviewed for this Article confirmed that dis-
persed leadership structures help hedge the risk of contingency fee litiga-
tion. One lawyer, for example, stated that he knew law firms that had bet
their firm on a single case and noted "those firms aren't around any-
more." Another lawyer noted, "if you split the case, you half the risk."
The lawyers noted that the desire to share leadership was especially sali-
ent in the riskier cases, such as cases where the law is unsettled or the
144. The portfolio model is especially important to lawyers' efforts to diversify because lawyers
are generally not allowed to diversify through other business models. A law firm, for example, cannot
easily hedge its risk by offering accounting or financial services because ethical rules in the United
States prohibit partnerships and fee-splitting arrangements between lawyers and nonlawyers. See, e.g.,
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 5.4 cmt. 1 (2002).
145. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Eco-
nomic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class And Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L.
REv. 669, 677, 704-07 (1986) (explaining that a plaintiff's attorney is "a utility-maximizing entrepre-
neur who manages a portfolio of actions and thus makes litigation decisions in an individual case based
upon their overall impact on the portfolio"); James H. Stock & David A. Wise, Market Compensation
in Class Action Suits: A Summary of Basic Ideas and Results, 16 CLASS ACTION REP. 584, 597-98
(1993) (discussing portfolio management techniques used by plaintiffs' firms).
146. See Coffee, supra note 145, at 704-07.
147. See id. at 706 (arguing that the "characteristically small size of plaintiffs attorneys' firms"
makes it difficult for firms to diversify their risk and that, "on such a scale, it is doubtful that plaintiffs
attorneys can achieve full diversification").
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plaintiffs are arguing for a change in the law. Firms did not want to invest
a significant amount of their own time and resources if they might not see
a return on this investment. As these interviews illustrate, dispersed
leadership structures can reflect sound business practices, even if they
appear inefficient to outsiders.
b. Easier Entry into the Litigation Market
Dispersed leadership structures also make it easier for new law
firms to enter the litigation market. These structures stand in stark con-
trast to a winner-take-all system in which the court chooses one or two
law firms to control a given case. Under a winner-take-all system, the
court will likely choose the more established firms for these leadership
roles because, in each leadership contest, the more established firms will
have greater experience, better clients, and more longstanding relation-
ships with the courts. A newer firm could still earn a leadership position
by developing a new angle in the case or targeting cases that the more
established firms do not pursue. Overall, however, winner-take-all lead-
ership rules are more likely to favor established law firms.'4 8
Dispersed leadership rules, on the other hand, allow newer entrants
to get a foothold in the market. If the leadership structure includes four
or five firms, newer entrants still may not get a lead counsel position, but
they may get a position on an executive committee with responsibility
over a certain aspect of the case. Firms can use this responsibility to
prove themselves to other firms. Over time, these opportunities may
translate into greater leadership roles.
These lower barriers to entry have led to more firms in the current
marketplace. The plaintiffs' bar in corporate litigation is increasingly
fragmented into smaller firms, many of which started filing state law
shareholder suits after the barriers to entry increased in other practice
areas, such as securities class actions.1 49 Several lawyers interviewed for
this Article noted this shift, observing that the number of law firms filing
corporate lawsuits in the state courts has increased dramatically in recent
years.5 0 These reduced barriers to entry have downsides, as explored
above, but there are advantages to limiting market concentration as
well.'
148. As discussed in greater detail below, this phenomenon has occurred in securities litigation.
There have been few new players in the securities bar since the enactment of the PSLRA's winner-
take-all lead plaintiff rules, reflecting the difficulties that newer entrants have in attracting the large
institutional clients necessary to secure a leadership position in a securities class action. See Choi &
Thompson, supra note 10, at 1514-15.
149. See Cheffins et al., supra note 11, at 431.
150. As one lawyer noted, for example, "There are no barriers to entry in the M&A/state law
side."
151. Dispersed leadership structures also foster a cross-pollination of ideas. On the defense side,
this cross-pollination tends to happen across cases as defense counsel observe successful litigation
tactics used in other cases. On the plaintiffs' side, however, this cross-pollination of ideas can occur
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As we have seen, the leadership market in corporate law allows
shirking and opportunism, while also promoting cooperative behavior in
limited instances. The next question is whether other areas of the law
offer additional insights that might improve leadership negotiations in
corporate law.
IV. LESSONS FROM OTHER LEADERSHIP MARKETS
Leadership disputes are not unique to corporate law. In many types
of class actions, it is common for multiple law firms to file similar law-
suits, forcing lawyers and courts to decide who will control the litigation.
This Part first describes the small-scale negotiations over leadership that
dominate many small consumer class actions. It then explores the larger-
scale negotiations-and more frequent judicial intervention-used to
decide leadership disputes in antitrust class actions. Finally, it describes
the hard-and-fast rules governing leadership in securities class actions.
As we shall see, the market for leadership in these three areas provides
important lessons into leadership disputes in corporate law.
A. Consumer Class Actions and Small-Scale Negotiations
Private ordering is the norm in many smaller class actions where
cases attract only a few filers. Consumer class actions are a prime exam-
ple. Although many consumer class actions are quite large with dozens of
law firms competing for a leadership role,'52 others are relatively small,'53
making it easier for the lawyers themselves to decide leadership issues.
Plaintiffs' lawyers conduct these negotiations against the backdrop
of relatively murky law. Consumer class actions filed in federal court are
governed by Rule 23(g). 154 As discussed above, this rule does not set out
a bright-line standard for the appointment of lead counsel. Instead, the
court can take into account a variety of factors, from the law firms' work
in identifying and investigating potential claims to their experience in
within cases. With multiple law firms involved in a single case, firms can share ideas and serve as a
check on one another, ultimately leading to better lawyering for the shareholder class.
152. See, e.g., Order No. 2: Adoption of Organization Plan and Appointment of Counsel, In re
Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, and Prods. Liab. Litig., (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 14, 2010) (No. 8:10ML 02151 JVS) (appointing a multitier leadership structure involving
separate committees of law firms for wrongful death cases, economic loss cases, discovery issues, and
liaison issues with state cases because "a larger group of counsel is needed to meet the needs of this
case"). The larger consumer class actions tend to resemble the antitrust class actions described in the
next Section, with large-scale negotiations and greater judicial involvement. This Section focuses on
smaller consumer class actions.
153. For example, one lawyer stated in his interview that "in consumer cases, there are fewer big
plaintiffs and fewer duplicate cases" and therefore the leadership disputes do not resemble the "feed-
ing frenzy" of corporate litigation.
154. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g).
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similar cases."'5 As a result, federal courts have substantial discretion in
making this choice.
Moreover, many consumer class actions are filed in state court,"'
where the law is even murkier."' There is a remarkable lack of case law
governing leadership issues in class actions at the state level. Some states
follow the lead of the federal courts, applying multifactor tests that re-
semble Rule 23.158 Other states approach leadership on a more ad hoc
basis.15 9 Given the lack of clear legal guidance in this area, the burden
often falls on the lawyers themselves to establish leadership structures."
Despite the imprecise legal standards, a set of norms have devel-
oped among the lawyers who practice regularly in this area. I interviewed
several lawyers who specialize in consumer class actions to understand
these norms. These lawyers stated that, in smaller consumer class actions,
the law firms typically agree to combine forces, dividing both the work
and the fees equally. Firms rarely insist on a winner-take-all arrangement
because they know that judges are unlikely to give a single firm control
of the case. As one lawyer stated, "no judge is going leave the second
[firm] out of the mix." Firms are well aware of this likely outcome if they
contest the dispute in court, and this knowledge informs their private
negotiations. In other words, just as in corporate litigation, the firms are
bargaining in the shadow of legal norms that favor private ordering and
inclusiveness.
These informal norms guide the negotiations. Although there is a
presumption that the firms will divide the case equally, this presumption
can be overcome if one law firm has superior experience or investigative
skills. For example, lawyers stated in their interviews that firms that take
the time to investigate and develop a case are more likely to get a bigger
share of a case than firms that merely copy another firm's complaint.
Similarly, firms with better reputations and/or greater manpower and
resources have greater leverage to demand a leadership role. For exam-
ple, if one large well-established firm and two smaller and less well-
known firms file similar lawsuits, it is generally accepted that the larger
firm will take a more active role in the litigation. These norms are fairly
155. See id. The lawyers stressed this point in their interviews, with one noting for example that
rule 23(g) gives judges "lots of leeway and discretion."
156. The Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA") provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction for most
class actions seeking over $5 million in damages. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012). CAFA, however,
does not apply to smaller class actions, which often remain in state courts.
157. See, e.g., In re Providian Credit Card Cases, No. A097482, 2003 WL 23002628, at *3 (Cal. Ct.
App. Dec. 22, 2003) (holding that the fact that California does not have any statutes or rules governing
lead counsel appointments means that the trial judge has "broad power" over these appointments).
158. See, e.g., Pollard v. Alpha Technical Servs., 102 So. 3d 71, 81 (La. Ct. App. 2011) (using rule
23(g) to guide lead counsel appointments in Louisiana).
159. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 14.211 (2004) (noting that one approach
for selecting lead counsel is for courts to "review[] the recommendations of lawyers who have filed
related actions and appointing the recommended lawyers if they are adequate to represent the inter-
ests of the class").
160. Id. § 21.272 (stating that, "although there are 'several methods' for selecting lead counsel,
"[b]y far the most common is the . . . 'private ordering' approach").
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similar to the norms that underlie leadership negotiations in corporate
litigation.' 1
On the whole, these arrangements seem to work relatively well. As
long as the firms are reliable and perform high-quality work, they are
able to divide the case fairly evenly between them. Moreover, a shared
leadership structure allows the firms to merge resources and pool the risk
inherent in a contingency fee lawsuit. There is always a risk that one firm
will not perform high-quality work or otherwise uphold their end of the
bargain, but the lawyers seemed generally content with sharing leader-
ship in these cases.
In a sense, then, the norms in consumer class actions are similar to
those in corporate litigation with private ordering dominating both prac-
tice areas. Yet important differences also emerged from the interviews.
The first difference arises from the fact that, although judges in consumer
class actions prefer private ordering, they are willing to decide leadership
disputes. One lawyer's comments on this point are illustrative. When
asked whether judges are willing to decide leadership disputes, she re-
plied "yes, of course" with some surprise that one would even need to
ask the question. She then stated that she could "not imagine" a judge
being unwilling to decide a leadership issue. In contrast, the lawyers who
specialize in corporate litigation universally stated that judges in these
cases do not want to decide leadership disputes and are often unwilling
to do so. 16 2
This difference has important implications for understanding the
market for leadership. As explained above, negotiation theory predicts
that parties will bargain in the shadow of the law as long as the law itself
is enforceable.' If courts are unwilling to enforce the law, however, the
parties have no incentive to incorporate the law into their own negotia-
tions."' As a result, law firms have a greater incentive to hold out in the
negotiations if they know that the court will not step in and resolve the
dispute.165 This difference in incentives helps explain why lawyers in con-
sumer class actions rarely mentioned the problem of hold outs, even
though the topic dominated many of the interviews of lawyers who file
corporate lawsuits.
The second key difference that emerged from the interviews was
that negotiations in consumer class actions almost never include a set
161. One key difference is that the size of the plaintiff's loss does not appear to be a relevant
factor in leadership negotiations in consumer class actions. The focus is on the lawyers' qualifications,
not on factors that make it more likely that the plaintiff will monitor their lawyers. This difference may
result from the fact that most plaintiffs in consumer class actions have relatively small stakes in the
litigation, whereas it is not uncommon for plaintiffs in corporate litigation to have claims in the mil-
lions of dollars.
162. See supra Part H.B.
163. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
164. See supra Part III.B.3.
165. See supra Part III.B.3.
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agreement over the division of fees."' In other words, lawyers in these
cases do not agree during their initial discussions that each firm will re-
ceive fifty percent of the fees ultimately awarded in the case. Instead,
they wait until the end of the case and divide fees based on the hours that
each firm spent on the case. They may agree on target percentages up
front, but the ultimate division of fees turns on the relative amount of
work done by each firm.' 7
Again, this difference has important implications for the dynamics
of shared leadership. If a law firm knows that it will receive fifty percent
of the fees in a given case regardless of its work on the case, it has a re-
duced incentive to work hard. As a result, early division of fees creates
incentives for some firms to free ride on the work of others. This dynam-
ic also encourages firms to give a share of the fees to other firms in the
case in order to gain a leadership position. As a result, it is not unusual
for firms in corporate lawsuits to demand a set percentage of the fees in
exchange for supporting the leadership structure.16s These payoffs do not
occur in consumer class actions because law firms do not receive a share
of the fees if they do not do their fair share of the work.
Despite these differences, leadership norms in consumer class ac-
tions provide important insights for corporate litigation. In cases that
lend themselves to smaller leadership structures, the law's hands-off ap-
proach works relatively well. As cases get bigger, however, it is harder
for firms to establish a leadership structure in which every law firm has a
meaningful role.
B. Antitrust Class Actions and Beauty Contests
Small-scale negotiations are not possible in larger class actions. If
small consumer class actions are at one end of the litigation spectrum,
antitrust class actions are at the other. In these cases, it is not uncommon
for twenty-five, fifty, or even one hundred different lawsuits to be filed in
connection with the same allegedly anticompetitive behavior.' 9 In such
cases, the lawyers cannot simply divide the litigation between them.
166. This observation is closely related to the earlier point about the value of judicial interven-
tion. If a firm insists on a guaranteed fee, the other firms could ask the court to intervene-an option
that is more difficult in corporate litigation.
167. The firms may also decide to increase or decrease a firm's lodestar by a multiplier to reflect
the actual contribution of a given firm's time. A firm that is responsible for the strategic decision mak-
ing and coordination in the case will generally receive a higher multiplier than a firm that simply re-
views documents, even if both firms work the same number of hours.
168. See supra Part III.C.1.a.
169. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 30 (2004) ("Antitrust litigation
can, however, involve voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence, extensive discovery, compli-
cated legal, factual, and technical (particularly economic) questions, numerous parties and attorneys,
and substantial sums of money, calling for the application of techniques and procedures for the man-
agement of complex litigation.").
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Instead they need a leadership structure that reflects the complexity of
the case.o70
Just as in corporate litigation, however, judges rarely decide leader-
ship issues in antitrust class actions.171 Instead, lawyers who practice in
this area state that, in most cases, the law firms themselves confer and
decide on a leadership structure. These structures are typically even
more complex than those used in corporate litigation. In corporate litiga-
tion, lawsuits may have three layers of leadership responsibilities (lead
counsel or co-lead counsel, an executive committee, and liaison counsel),
but few cases have more than that. In antitrust litigation, it is common for
lead counsel to oversee a sprawling number of committees, each respon-
sible for one aspect of the litigation. These committees in turn each have
lead counsel who oversees a number of law firms charged with support-
ing the specific litigation efforts entrusted to the committee.
As a result, leadership structures in antitrust litigation are even
more dispersed than those in corporate litigation. And yet the antitrust
lawyers interviewed for this Article had far fewer complaints than the
lawyers who handle corporate lawsuits. They did not always think that
the process worked perfectly, but none described it as the worst part of
their practice. Three factors may account for this difference.
First, most antitrust class actions require far more manpower than
most corporate lawsuits." The lawyers in this area repeatedly stressed
that most antitrust class actions are so big that lead counsel legitimately
needs the help of multiple other firms to fund and litigate cases. A typical
case may include millions of documents, dozens of depositions, and mul-
tiple complex briefing battles. This heavy workload is so common that
the law firms that typically serve as lead counsel have developed exper-
tise in overseeing the various firms in the lower rungs of the leadership
structure. 73 As a result, all of the firms included in the leadership struc-
ture have substantive work to do, unlike many of the firms in the lower
rungs of a corporate lawsuit.
Second, as in consumer class actions, the firms typically do not allo-
cate fees at the start of the cases. As explained above, in many corporate
lawsuits, the law firms bargain for specific fee percentages in exchange
170. As in corporate litigation, the black letter law vests the responsibility for deciding leadership
with judges. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(g).
171. This description of the leadership market in antitrust class actions is based on several inter-
views with attorneys who practice in this area. See supra Part I (describing interviews undertaken for
this Article).
172. Despite the larger size of most antitrust class actions, the number of law firms in the leader-
ship structure remains a concern for courts. Rule 23(g) does not specifically address when multiple
lead counsel are appropriate, but the Committee Note cautions that "the court should be alert to the
need for adequate staffing of the case, but also to the risk of overstaffing or an ungainly counsel struc-
ture." See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g) advisory committee notes. Consistent with these concerns, one lawyer
interviewed for this Article stated that judges will reject proposed leadership orders with too many law
firms in a lead counsel role.
173. The lawyers described these structures in their interviews, with one stating that the antitrust
bar has the management of these cases "down to a science at this point."
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for agreeing to a proposed leadership structure.174 For example, a law
firm may bargain for ten percent of the fee in exchange for supporting
the leadership structure. This percentage may or may not come with an
expectation that the law firm will actually do ten percent of the work. In
contrast, the antitrust lawyers stated in their interviews that the distribu-
tion of fees in antitrust class actions turns on the actual work performed
by each law firm, as well as the multipliers assigned to each level of the
leadership structure. In other words, law firms do not receive a share of
the fees simply for agreeing to the leadership structure. If a firm does not
pull its weight in a given case, the law firms at higher levels of the leader-
ship structure will simply assign the work to another firm and that firm,
rather than the original firm, will be paid for the work. As a result, the
opportunity to free ride is much lower in antitrust class actions.
Finally, judges are more willing to decide leadership disputes in an-
titrust cases. As noted above, private negotiations over leadership are
common, and the lawyers stated in their interviews that federal judges
prefer this private ordering. But they also stated that, despite this prefer-
ence, judges are willing to decide leadership disputes. Indeed, when
asked about the role of holdouts during the firms' negotiations, the law-
yers stated that they would simply take the dispute to the judge. Lawyers
do not feel like they are forced to include law firms in a leadership posi-
tion simply because judges will not decide leadership issues.
In short, private ordering functions quite differently in consumer
and antitrust class actions than it does in corporate litigation. In consum-
er and antitrust class actions, the lawyers themselves still resolve most
leadership disputes, but (1) firms are not paid unless they put in their fair
share of the work, and (2) judges are willing to decide leadership dis-
putes if the lawyers cannot work out a workable solution. These differ-
ences provide insight into the problems in corporate litigation, where the
norms regarding fees and judicial involvement are quite different. Private
ordering, in other words, need not present the problems that are so per-
sistent in corporate litigation. As we will see, however, private ordering is
not the only way to decide leadership disputes in complex litigation.
C. Securities Class Actions and Hard-and-Fast Rules
The world of securities litigation offers a very different way to de-
termine leadership in class actions. Rather than leaving leadership dis-
putes to private ordering, Congress created rules to govern the leader-
ship process. In 1995, Congress enacted the PSLRA, which created a
strong presumption that the lead plaintiff in a securities class action is the
shareholder applicant with the largest financial stake in the litigation.175
174. See supra Part III.B.2.c.
175. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)-(v) (2012).
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The lead plaintiff in turn chooses lead counsel.176 Accordingly, in the vast
majority of federal securities class actions, lead counsel is chosen using a
bright-line rule, not the more flexible standard that applies in other types
of complex litigation.
This rule has eliminated most, but not all, leadership fights in securi-
ties class actions. As with any bright-line rule, there have been questions
of interpretation. For example, courts have had to decide whether for-
eign investors are eligible to serve as lead plaintiffs.'77 Courts have also
struggled with how to calculate the financial losses of the competing
shareholders."' In general, however, the PSLRA has greatly simplified
the leadership process.
As this simplification has occurred, judges overseeing securities
class actions have become suspicious of the dispersed leadership struc-
tures that are so common in corporate litigation. This suspicion is most
apparent when it comes to groups of plaintiffs who try to join together
and aggregate their losses when filing for lead plaintiff."'7  Such aggrega-
tion is permissible in most instances, but courts generally prefer smaller
leadership structures that allow cohesiveness and better monitoring of
class counsel." 0 Indeed, the Securities & Exchange Commission has even
filed amicus briefs urging courts to examine such groups carefully, cau-
tioning that they may not have the active oversight and monitoring capa-
bility of a single lead counsel.'
This suspicion has led to relatively streamlined leadership structures
in most securities class actions. According to one empirical study, more
than sixty percent of securities class actions include only one or two firms
serving as lead counsel."8 Less than twenty percent of the cases had more
than three firms serving as lead counsel.' 3
176. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v) ("The most adequate plaintiff shall, subject to the approval of
the court, select and retain counsel to represent the class.").
177. Compare In re Molson Coors Brewing Co. Secs. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 147, 151 (D. Del. 2005)
(noting that many courts have appointed foreign investors as lead plaintiff), with Steinberg v. Ericsson
LM Tel. Co., No. 07 Civ. 9615(RPP), 2008 WL 1721484, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2008 Apr. 11, 2008) (denying
foreign investor's motion to serve as lead plaintiff).
178. See, e.g., In re Nice Sys. Secs. Litig., 188 F.R.D. 206, 217 (D.N.J. 1999) (noting that the
PSLRA "does not define 'largest financial interest' or provide guidance as to how such a determina-
tion is made"); In re LightlnTheBox Hldg. Co., Secs. Litig., No. 13 Civ. 6016(PKC), 2013 WL 6145114,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2013) (explaining that courts use different accounting methods in calculating
financial losses under the PSLRA).
179. The PSLRA specifies that the court should adopt a presumption that the "person or group of
persons" with the "the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class" should be the lead
plaintiff, suggesting that plaintiffs should be allowed to aggregate their losses. 15 U.S.C. §78u-
4(a)(3)(B)(iii) (emphasis added).
180. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Optimal Lead Plaintiffs, 64 VAND. L. REv. 1109, 1139
(2011) (explaining that "[o]n the whole, courts prefer smaller groups and principally reject larger ones
... [because] smaller groups more effectively manage the litigation and lawyers").
181. See Memorandum of the SEC as Amicus Curiae, In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 186 F.R.D. 214,233 (D.D.C. 1999).
182. See Burch, supra note 180, at 1120.
183. See id
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The different leadership practices in securities litigation raise the
question whether states should adopt a similar bright-line rule to govern
leadership fights in corporate lawsuits. And yet, while securities litigation
has certainly changed in the wake of the PSLRA, these changes have not
always been for the better. First, the winner-take-all approach has en-
couraged unethical practices in the solicitation of clientsM Legal scholars
have raised the possibility that some public pension funds may be trading
their participation in litigation for campaign contributions.' These prac-
tices are entirely predictable given the incentives created by the PSLRA.
If the livelihood of attorneys depends on a client base of institutional in-
vestors, it is not surprising that attorneys have gone to great lengths to
secure these clients. This example illustrates the unintended consequenc-
es of bright-line rules governing leadership.
Moreover, there is reason to question the underlying premise of the
PSLRA. Should the law firm with the largest shareholder client automat-
ically be in charge of a complex lawsuit potentially worth tens, or even
hundreds, of millions of dollars? Ultimately, the goal of any leadership
rule is to select counsel that will best represent the interests of absent
shareholders. The size of a shareholder's stockholdings is certainly a rel-
evant proxy, but it is imperfect at best. To give one example, a share-
holder with 10,000 shares in the target company is not necessarily a bet-
ter monitor than a shareholder with 9,500 shares. This is especially true
if, for example, the 10,000 shares represent only a small fraction of the
first shareholder's overall investments whereas the 9,500 shares represent
the second shareholder's entire retirement fund."6 Under these circum-
stances, we might expect that the second shareholder will care more
about the litigation, and therefore serve as a better monitor over the
case, even though he has fewer shares than the first shareholder.',
In the end, the PSLRA represents the classic tradeoff between rules
versus standards. There is no guarantee that the PSLRA's bright-line
rule always leads to the best leadership structures. Bright-line rules,
however, do allow courts to decide leadership disputes quickly and help
ensure that institutional plaintiffs with greater stakes in the litigation
control complex lawsuits.
184. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi et al., The Price of Pay to Play in Securities Class Actions, 8 J. EM-
PIRICAL LEGAL STUDS. 650, 650-51 (2011); David H. Webber, Is "Pay-to-Play" Driving Public Pen-
sion Fund Activism in Securities Class Actions?, 90 B.U. L. REv. 2031, 2080-81 (2010).
186. The Delaware Court of Chancery has raised similar concerns in rejecting the bright-line rules
of the PSLRA. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
187. In addition, there is no guarantee under the PSLRA that any shareholder will have a large
enough stake in the case to monitor it effectively. The PSLRA is based on market principles that pre-
sume that the shareholder with the largest financial stake in a lawsuit will have an incentive to choose
the best law firm to represent the class. Imagine, however, that two shareholders are competing to be
lead plaintiff. One of the plaintiffs claims damages of $1000, while the other claims damages of $2000.
Under these circumstances, neither plaintiff has a large enough interest to spend the time necessary to
compare the qualifications of different law firms, much less monitor the lawsuit after it has made this
choice. Accordingly, it may make more sense for courts to choose among the law firms directly, rather
than placing false hopes on shareholders.
No. 4] 1521
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
V. TOWARD A NEW MARKET FOR LEADERSHIP IN CORPORATE
LITIGATION
We have seen that the market for leadership in corporate litigation
operates differently than the market in other types of complex litigation.
In corporate litigation, the judiciary's hands-off approach, combined with
a practice of dividing fees early in the litigation, creates strong incentives
for plaintiffs' lawyers to agree to overly inclusive leadership structures.8 1
These structures in turn promote inefficiencies and reduce the incentives
to invest in these lawsuits.'89
Corporate law should draw on insights from other types of complex
litigation to address these problems. Comparing leadership practices in
corporate litigation to those in other types of complex litigation, the most
significant difference that emerges relates to the role of judges. In all
three of the areas examined in Part IV, judges are willing to decide lead-
ership disputes. In consumer and antitrust class actions, judges intervene
when the lawyers themselves cannot decide on a leadership structure.190
In securities class actions, judges decide leadership in the first instance
using the rules laid out in the PSLRA.'9' In none of these areas, however,
do judges turn the process entirely over to lawyers. This norm of judicial
involvement stands in stark contrast to the hands-off approach that dom-
inates corporate litigation.
Judicial involvement in leadership disputes is crucial because the
law on the books has little impact if judges are unwilling to enforce it.
This point reflects foundational principles of negotiation theory-
lawyers can only bargain in the shadow of the law if judges are willing to
cast that shadow.'" In corporate litigation, this shadow is lacking. Law-
yers do not think that judges are willing to step in and make the hard
choices that leadership decisions require. As a result, lawyers lack the
negotiating leverage to exclude law firms that do not contribute to the
case.
Greater judicial involvement would also impact the second key dif-
ference in leadership practices-the division of fees among law firms. As
outlined in Part IV, lawyers in other areas do not typically divide fees at
the outset of the case. As a result, a law firm working on an antitrust or
consumer class action is not guaranteed ten or twenty percent of the case
simply because they agreed to the leadership structure. This difference
impacts the incentives to litigate these cases. A law firm that knows that
it will receive ten percent of a case regardless of its individual contribu-
tion will not be motivated to work as hard as a law firm whose fee is
based on the hours it puts into the case.
188. See supra Part IV.A.
189. See supra Part III.C.1.c.
190. See supra Part V.
191. See supra Part IV.C.
192. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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The different practices related to the allocation of fees circles back
to the role of judges in these lawsuits. Judges in antitrust and consumer
lawsuits are willing to decide leadership disputes, and therefore, law
firms with a superior claim to a leadership position have leverage in their
negotiations with competing firms.19 3 If judges in corporate litigation
were more willing to decide these disputes, law firms could take their
disputes to court rather than buying off their competitors. This shift
would keep a higher percentage of the legal fees with the firms that actu-
ally perform the work, which will in turn increase the incentives to liti-
gate these cases effectively.
This discussion is not meant to suggest that judges today never de-
cide leadership disputes in corporate lawsuits. The data indicates that
judges determine the leadership structure in approximately ten percent
of cases, and this percentage has increased over the last several years.194
Lawyers believe, however, that judges are extremely reluctant to decide
these cases and therefore will force them to go back to the negotiating
table."9 These beliefs, combined with courts' oft-stated admonition that
lawyers should resolve these disputes privately, create a strong norm in
favor of private ordering.
Moreover, in their interviews, the lawyers who practice in the area
of corporate litigation almost all stated that they wished judges would
take a more active role in deciding leadership disputes.1 96 One lawyer
stated starkly that "[i]f the court isn't going to decide leadership, the
[Hirt] factors don't have as much significance." These lawyers also em-
phasized that judges can change the dynamics in private negotiations,
even if they leave the substantive law unchanged. Under current practic-
es, the Hirt factors have little impact on private negotiations. Yet, "if the
judges started saying, here are the factors, and then actually started mak-
ing decisions, if they decided some of the cases, then when firms are ne-
gotiating, they would have to incorporate the guidelines."
Given the benefits of judicial involvement in leadership negotia-
tions, why have judges in corporate lawsuits been content to turn the ne-
gotiations over to lawyers? There are at least two reasons. First, in many
mergers and acquisitions lawsuits, there is tremendous pressure on both
sides to resolve the litigation quickly.'" Many transactions are announced
193. See supra Part IV.A-B.
194. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
195. See supra Part II.B.
196. For example, in one oral argument, counsel urged the court to pick a single lead counsel
rather than appoint all of the competing firms as co-lead counsel. The lawyer argued that lawyers need
"some risk that people face by not coming to an agreement and being reasonable." Oral Argument for
Cross-Motions for Appointment of Lead Counsel at 44, In re Crimson Exploration, Inc. Stockholder
Litig., No. 8541-VCP, 2013 WL 5890398 (Del. Ch. July 12, 2013).
197. See N. Browning Jeffries, The Plaintiffs' Lawyer's Transaction Tax: The New Cost of Doing
Business in Public Company Deals, 45 BERKELEY Bus. L. J. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 45),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2329133&download=yes (describing
the time pressures in merger lawsuits).
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only a few months before they are scheduled to close."'s The defendants
want to ensure that the litigation will not delay the closing of the transac-
tion. The plaintiffs in turn know that the settlement value of the case will
plummet after the transaction closes because they lose their primary lev-
erage over the defendants.'" As a result, both sides want to move the
lawsuit along as quickly as they can.
These time pressures discourage judges from more active involve-
ment in leadership disputes. Under current rules, a dispute over leader-
ship is treated like any other legal dispute.? The parties fully brief the
issue over a period of weeks. 2 01 After this briefing is complete, the judges
will typically hold oral arguments and then issue a ruling.2" While leader-
ship is still in flux, the judge typically will not require the defendants to
respond to discovery or answer the complaints. 203 In other words, judicial
involvement in leadership disputes has the potential to unduly delay
leadership decisions in already time-pressured lawsuits.204
The data confirms these concerns. In cases in which the parties
themselves agreed on a leadership structure, leadership was resolved in a
median of twenty-one days. In contrast, in those cases in which the court
decided leadership, resolution of this issue took another two weeks, or a
median of thirty-five days. Those additional weeks can be critical in cor-
porate litigation.
And yet judicial involvement does not need to unduly delay these
lawsuits. For example, rather than filing lengthy briefs, the court could
require all law firms interested in a leadership position to file a standard
form on a single date. This form could address the Hirt factors in a
streamlined way that would be easy for the court to review. There would
not be the back and forth of typical motions practice, and the court
would only schedule an oral argument if it believed that one would be
helpful. In other words, judges have the freedom to adopt a more stream-
lined approach that would allow them to decide leadership disputes
quickly.
The second reason that judges may be reluctant to get involved in
leadership disputes is that they may doubt their institutional competency
in this area. At first glance, this concern may appear ill-founded given the
wide range of issues that judges decide. If judges are qualified to inter-
pret contracts, decide employment discrimination claims, and assess the
validity of patents, why can't they also appoint lead counsel? The ques-
tion, however, is not whether judges are competent to decide leadership
198. See id.
199. Several lawyers stressed this point in their interviews. One lawyer stated, for example, that
they simply do not have a month for opening briefs and then two weeks for the reply when the deal
closes in less than two months.
200. See In re Revlon, Inc. S'holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 953-54 (Del. Ch. 2010).
201. See id. at 954.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 945.
204. See id. at 960.
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issues, but rather whether judges are more competent to decide these
issues than the lawyers themselves.
This question is especially relevant given that leadership is an area
where lawyers have particular expertise. They have far more contact with
each other than most judges do. Lawyers know who among them is likely
to bring the right skills and a strong work ethic to the case and, converse-
ly, who is likely to shirk their responsibilities.2 05 They also know the law-
yers with whom they work best-i.e., the lawyers whose strengths com-
plement their weakness and whose personalities mesh best with their
own. Moreover, they have an insider's view of the case and therefore
may have the best sense of which organizational structure will allow
them to litigate the case effectively.
Yet, judicial intervention need not rule out a role for private order-
ing. Lawyers can still have the freedom to organize leadership structures
in the first instance. For example, judges may decide to intervene only in
those cases where the leadership structure involves an overly high num-
ber of law firms. Or they could simply signal to lawyers that they are will-
ing to decide leadership disputes when the law firms themselves cannot
decide on a resolution. Under either approach, the lawyers would still
negotiate leadership, but judges would step in to enforce the law when
the negotiations run a risk of hurting shareholders. In short, judicial
oversight and private ordering can work in tandem to resolve leadership
disputes.
If greater judicial involvement is necessary to solve the problems
related to leadership in corporate litigation, how do we get there? It may
not be easy. As other legal scholars have demonstrated, judges are sel-
dom inclined to play an active role monitoring complex lawsuits. In the
settlement context, for example, judges are supposed to serve as gate-
keepers,206 ensuring that proposed settlements are in the best interests of
absent class members.2 0 And yet, judges rarely reject settlements put
forth by counsel. 208
This hesitance in the settlement context reflects the reality of the
judicial role in performing a monitoring function. First, judicial dockets
are so full that judges may not feel that they have the luxury of looking
205. Judges may also get an impression of the law firms over time. For example, the Delaware
Court of Chancery has stated law firms can "build (and sometimes burn) reputational capital with the
Court" by their actions in particular cases. Id. at 955-56.
206. See Hillary A. Sale, Judges Who Settle, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 377, 414 (2011) (stating that
"judges both have the power and incentives to control the agency costs [in class action settlements] by
refusing to grant settlement approval in cases that do not meet the standards of Rule 23" and that "the
decision to grant, or refuse, approval is contingent on fulfilling their gatekeeping/fiduciary responsibili-
ties").
207. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
208. See, e.g., Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L.
REV. 65, 91, n.107 (2003); William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory
Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1445 (2006); Sale, supra note 206.
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for fights where there are none. 20 Second, judges are praised for moving
through their dockets quickly, a goal that is stymied by more active re-
view of settlement terms.2t0 Finally, judges suffer from an informational
deficiency in reviewing settlements because the parties all have an incen-
tive to present only a favorable view of the settlement.211 As a result, de-
spite several proposals for greater judicial oversight over settlements in
class action lawsuits,212 judges continue to rubber stamp most settlements
presented to them.
On the surface, many of the same institutional concerns outlined
above apply to leadership disputes as well. In both instances, the lawyers
negotiate the terms of the agreement largely outside the watchful eye of
the court. In both instances, the lawyers then present the terms to the
court as a fait accompli. And in both instances, the judges face significant
institutional pressure to approve the terms as negotiated by the parties.
Yet, there is reason to believe that judges can take a more active
role in leadership disputes than they have in the past. As outlined in Part
IV, judges in other areas of the law are much more willing to decide these
disputes.2 13 Lawyers who litigate consumer or antitrust class actions re-
peatedly stated that while private ordering is still the norm, judges are
willing to decide leadership disputes if the parties cannot resolve these
disputes themselves. If judges in these areas can step up and decide lead-
ership issues, there is no reason why judges in corporate litigation cannot
do the same.
One judge has already taken aim at the norms governing leadership.
Over the last few years, Vice Chancellor Travis Laster of the Delaware
Court of Chancery has often used a streamlined approach to decide
leadership disputes. Under this approach, soon after a party in a case
files a leadership motion, Vice Chancellor Laster issues an order requir-
ing any law firm seeking a leadership position to file an application ad-
dressing various factors relevant to the court's decision. 2 14 He then de-
cides these disputes on an expedited basis. 215
209. See Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and
Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REv. 991, 1061 (2002) ("[C]ourt dockets are sufficient-
ly full that judges have little incentive to coerce parties to litigate.").
210. See id. ("Judges receive praise and prestige for having a 'rocket docket,' whereby cases are
concluded quickly, either through settlement or a trial on the merits.. .. In the justice factory, volume
often equals respect.").
211. See Rubenstein, supra note 208, at 1445 ("Because counsel for the plaintiff class and the
defendant share an interest in obtaining court approval of the settlement, judges are unlikely to re-
ceive information that could be relevant to the fairness of the settlement from the parties them-
selves.").
212. See Lahav, supra note 208, at 114.
213. See infra Part IV.
214. See, e.g., Order of Consolidation, In re Power-One Inc. Stockholder Litig., (Del. Ch. May 23,
2013) (Case No. 8506-VCL).
215. Notably, this procedure does not change the substantive legal standards governing leadership
in shareholder lawsuits. Vice Chancellor Laster instructs the parties to address the Hirt factors in their
applications. See id. This procedure shows that judges do not need to change the substantive law to
change leadership practices. Instead, as they increasingly decide leadership disputes, they can change
these norms underlying the substantive law, allowing the law to operate more effectively.
1526 [Vol. 2015
LEADERSHIP IN CORPORATE LITIGATION
This procedure is changing leadership practices on the ground. Sev-
eral lawyers referenced Vice Chancellor Laster's procedure in their in-
terviews, with one stating specifically that "it has changed the way that
lead counsel battles are fought." This change is reflected in the data. In
2013, for example, the percentage of contested leadership battles dramat-
ically increased. The data collected for this study shows that from 2009
through 2012, the court decided a contested leadership battle in only
9.38% of cases. In 2013, this percentage jumped to twenty percent. Alt-
hough the numbers of contested leadership battles in the sample across
all years are small, it is notable that Vice Chancellor Laster decided half
of the leadership disputes from 2013 included in this study. Given that
there are a total of five judges on the Delaware Court of Chancery, 2 1 6 one
would not expect one judge to hear such a high percentage of the con-
tested leadership disputes in a given year. The number of contested cases
in the sample is still too small to draw any definitive conclusions, but
these figures do suggest that lawyers may be more willing to bring their
leadership disputes to court if they know the judge hearing the case is
willing to decide the dispute.2 17
Relatedly, the ability to change the norms in corporate litigation
does not depend on every judge taking an active role in leadership dis-
putes. Some judges may embrace their new role wholeheartedly; others
may simply rubberstamp the proposals suggested by counsel. A change
on the part of a few outspoken judges, however, could lead to more
widespread changes behind the scenes. After all, the goal of this proposal
is to change the norms that operate in private negotiations. To change
these norms, lawyers need to know that there is a realistic possibility that
judges will deny the demands of holdouts and question overly complicat-
ed leadership structures. This possibility exists as long as some judges are
willing to enter the leadership fray. As a result, some judicial involve-
ment may be all that is necessary for lawyers to be in a better position to
self-regulate.
Finally, the different approaches to leadership in complex litigation
demonstrate that there is not a single template that corporate law must
follow. Securities class actions are governed by the hard-and-fast rules of
the PSLRA, while consumer and antitrust class actions rely on the more
flexible standards of Rule 23-yet lawyers in both areas seem generally
satisfied with the outcomes. These examples illustrate that the form of
judicial involvement may be less important than the fact that judges in
216. See Judicial Officers of the Court of Chancery, DEL. ST. Crs., http://courts.delaware.gov/
chancery/judges.stm (last visited Mar. 4, 2015).
217. Vice Chancellor's Laster's approach is not the only way to solve the problems in this area.
For example, three attorneys at the law firm of Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP have
suggested that courts decide leadership using a nationwide procedure similar to the procedure re-
quired under the PSLRA. See Mark Lebovitch, et al., Making Order Out of Chaos: A Proposal to
Improve Organization and Coordination in Multi-Jurisdictional Merger-Related Litigation, BERNSTEIN,
LITowITz, BERGER AND GROSSMAN LLP (Sept. 15, 2012), available at http://www.blbglaw.com/
miscfiles/MakingOrderoutofChaos.
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these areas of law are willing to step in and decide these disputes. In oth-
er words, it is judicial involvement-regardless of the exact nature of the
involvement-that provides the foundation for a properly functioning
leadership market.
We have seen multiple windows into the market for leadership in
corporate litigation, and yet they all point to the same need for greater
judicial involvement in leadership disputes. The quantitative data on
leadership orders demonstrates that, left to their own devices, lawyers
are forced to agree to overly inclusive leadership structures. 2 18 The inter-
view data reveals that, on the whole, lawyers want judges to step in and
decide leadership disputes when the lawyers themselves cannot reach a
satisfactory agreement. 219 And data from other types of complex litiga-
tion suggest that greater judicial involvement in these disputes can
change leadership practices on the ground. 20 The time has come to heed
these lessons and reform the market for leadership in corporate litiga-
tion.
VI. CONCLUSION
Conventional wisdom holds that leadership decisions are best left to
the lawyers. As this Article demonstrates, however, this wisdom does not
reflect the modern reality of corporate litigation. The legal system's reli-
ance on private ordering forces lawyers to agree to complicated leader-
ship structures that divide governance responsibilities among far too
many legal actors. These lawyers then face incentives to shirk their re-
sponsibilities in the ensuing litigation. In an area of law that depends in
large part on private attorneys general, these incentives undermine en-
forcement of the law and ultimately hurt shareholders.
In the end, the debate over leadership rules reflects deeper ques-
tions about governance in class action litigation. The legal system has
struggled to address the agency problems in class actions, recognizing
that attorneys do not always face the right incentives to act in the best
interests of their absentee clients. Leadership disputes illustrate that
these problems extend beyond the incentives facing individual lawyers.
Instead, they affect how lawyers relate to each other and how they in
turn relate to the court. To ensure proper governance over these com-
plex cases, the law and the market must work in tandem to align the in-
terests of lawyers with those of their clients.
218. See supra Part II.A.
219. See supra Part HI.B.
220. See supra Part III.
1528 [Vol. 2015
